Showing posts with label Divorce. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Divorce. Show all posts

Sunday, November 6, 2016

False character assassination, False case, threat to life etc all amounts to Cruelty


IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Judgment Reserved on: October 03, 2016 Judgment Delivered on: October 07, 2016 MAT.APP.(F.C.) 63/2016
SANTOSH SAHAY ..... Appellant
Represented by: Mr.A.K.Sharma & Mr.C.M. Sharma, Advocates.

versus
HANUMAN SAHAY ..... Respondent
Represented by: Mr.Arunav Tiwari, Advocate with respondent in person.

CORAM:
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP NANDRAJOG HON’BLE MS. JUSTICE PRATIBHA RANI PRATIBHA RANI, J.

1. The appellant/wife is in appeal impugning the judgment and decree dated January 30, 2016 whereby the respondent/husband has been granted a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty. For the sake of convenience we shall be referring the parties as ‘the wife’ and ‘the husband’.
2. HMA Petition No.73/10 (Old No.402/07) was filed by the husband seeking dissolution of marriage with the respondent on the ground of cruelty and desertion. The status of the parties at the time of marriage as pleaded in para 2 of the divorce petition was as under:
(i) Husband – 23 years – Hindu Bachelor
(ii) Wife – 18 years – Virgin
3. The marriage was consummated. The couple was blessed with two sons – elder one born on July 12, 2003 and younger one born on September 09, 2005.

4. It was an arranged marriage. The husband was belonging to a family of farmers though employed as teacher in Rajasthan. The father of the wife was a Government servant. As per the husband the wife was not comfortable leading a rural life in the village. When the husband got selected as a teacher in Delhi after one year of marriage, he brought his wife to Delhi. There were some temperamental differences between the husband and wife and of the wife with her in-laws. As per the husband the wife used to disrespect the guests visiting them and was not even preparing tea for them. His wife was indulged in some tantrik activities and performing ‘Tantrik Kriya’ which terrified him. She also used to light a diya during midnight and perform puja. She also put clove, cardamom and beetle nut under his pillow cover. The wife also used to tie half baked bread smeared with vermilion on her belly, prepare a effigy of flour and used to insert the iron nail (keel) in it and immerse it in Yamuna river. She made an attempt to strangulate him with her hands. She also used to avoid physical relations. Though he tried to make her understand the need to satisfy the sexual desires, she did not pay any heed and continued avoiding him. Not only that, she also accused him of having illicit relationship with


another lady. The husband has also pleaded that he is a non-smoker a teetotaller but he was defamed by her as an alcoholic and womanizer. This adversely affected his reputation in the family so much so that he even thought of committing suicide. The averments made in para 46 of the petition refer to the incident where after the wife left the matrimonial home, are extracted hereunder:
’46. That from that day the Petitioner had the sleepless night, the petitioner was always worried about his sons and their life. The petitioner never had sleep after that day. The respondent again one day when petitioner was sleeping came and again tried to strangulate him. The respondent was as if she was under some evil spell, taking the knife in her hand she tried to kill the petitioner. It was midnight time; the petitioner after getting rid of her went out of his house and keeps on roaming in the street like a mad whole night. The bad thoughts about his sons keep on haunting the Petitioner whole night. The petitioner after mustering up some courage and believing god went back to his house in the morning but to his shock and his dismay, the respondent was gone with his both son. That when enquired from the neighbours it transpired that the Respondent without informing anybody with her bag and baggage.’
5. The husband sought divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion.
6. In the written statement the wife denied all the instances of cruelty and desertion alleged in the divorce petition. She pleaded that her husband was not a bachelor at the time of his marriage with her. His first wife committed suicide by jumping into the well because of the harassment and torture caused to her. After her marriage she was also severely beaten by her father-in-law Sh.Ram Sahay and brothers-in-law Sh.Ranjeet, Sh.Parbhas Dayal, Sh.Ram Gopal and Sh.Ram Babu. She also claimed that she was harassed on non-fulfilment of the dowry demand. While pleading that the parties were having normal conjugal relationship till the period March 28, 2007 to June 18, 2007, when the husband had gone to attend the marriage of her sister on June 19, 2007 at Alwar, Rajasthan, he returned without attending the marriage.
7. While raising preliminary objection about the maintainability of the divorce petition but admitting relationship of husband and wife between the parties, the wife pleaded it to be a case of she being harassed on account of dowry demand. She also pleaded that the husband had relations with other women. He always came late at night in drunken state and did not share bed with her in the same room for sleeping at night and had been neglecting not only her but also his matrimonial obligations.
8. While the husband examined himself as PW1 he also produced two more witnesses as PW2 – Kishan Lal and PW3 – Bhagwan Dass who visited them and were insulted by his wife.
9. The wife examined herself as RW1.
10. After considering the evidence adduced by the parties, learned Judge, Family Court dismissed the divorce petition on the ground of desertion for the reason that the divorce petition was filed before expiry of statutory period of two years from the date of desertion.
11. On the ground of cruelty, learned Judge, Family Court concluded as under:
(i) The allegations regarding demands of dowry by the wife are general, vague and ambiguous.

(ii) There was no evidence of her husband being earlier married or the wife committing suicide on account of dowry demand.
(iii) The wife has tarnished the reputation of the husband by assassinating his character that he was having relationship with a school teacher.


12. Written submissions running into 13 pages have been filed by the learned counsel for the appellant, major part of which refer to the pleadings in the divorce petition. The contentions raised in the written submissions to disprove cruelty by the wife can be noted as under:
(i) The husband was under graduate at the time of marriage. The fact that he not only completed his graduation but also got a Government job after one year of marriage reflects that the wife provided a peaceful and healthy environment at home.
(ii) The persons who were allegedly defamed or insulted by the wife have not been examined and even PW2 and PW3 did not depose about any rumour being heard by them which had the effect of adversely affecting the character of the husband.
(iii) The wife is only 8th Class pass and there is no question of she getting any job in place of her husband if something goes wrong with him.
(iv) Birth of two children out of this wedlock indicates her dedication and love for the husband.
(v) The allegation against her of making long calls from PCO on the false pretext, that she was calling her family, has not been established.
(vi) Name of the Tantrik who performed the puja is not disclosed.
(vii) No complaint was made to the police when the husband was allegedly tried to be strangulated by her.
(viii) She always expressed her desire to live with the husband which has not been considered by the Family Court.
(ix) The legal recourse taken by her by filing petition under Section 125 Cr.P.C. and FIR No.901/07 under Section 498A/406/34 IPC at PS Uttam Nagar against the husband and his family does not amount to cruelty.
13. Before dealing with the contentions raised on behalf of the wife we would like to note that in the written statement filed on August 23, 2007 by the wife she had made various defamatory allegations against the husband especially in preliminary objection No.5 which reads as under:
‘That the petitioner is a teacher and he has the relation with other women and he always came late at night with drinking condition and he was not shared, the room for sleeping at night and thus, the respondent has neglecting from the matrimonial relation as husband and wife, hence, this present petition is liable to be dismissed with cost.’
14. Thereafter in FIR No.901/07 under Section 498A/406/34 IPC, registered on December 07, 2007 at PS Uttam Nagar, apart from making allegations of she being harassed and tortured on account of dowry demand, without referring the month/year even by approximation she pleaded of being compelled to bring `50,000 from her parents for purpose of arranging a job for the husband. She apprised her parents about the physical and mental torture and the beatings given by her father-in-law as well younger brothers of her husband, she being dragged out of the house and again given beating by kicking and hitting with fist and blows. She talked to her father who sent `50,000 through her Fufa – Sh.Madan Lal and thereafter she was kept well for a few days. The FIR further reads as under:
‘mere pati Hanuman Sahay sarkari school mein master ki naukri par lag gaye hain. Jo kuch baad hi ek aurat jo mere pati ke school mein teacher hai ko ghar par laaye aure mujhe batlaya ki yeh meri dharma ki behan hai lekin 3⁄4 mah baad hi uske avaid sambandh sthapit kar liye aur


ab mujhe tatha mere bachhon ko beghar karke nikalna chahta hai. Mere pita ji biradari ke paanch-saat logon ko le kar iske paas (pati ke paas) aaye aur samjhane ki koshish ki jis par Hanuman Sahay (pati) ne kaha ki main to dusari aurat rakhunga. Jo chahe kar lo. Aap se anurodh prarthna hai ki meri shikayat par uchit karyavahi kar ke mera jeevan surakshit kiya jaaye.’
15. Perusal of the LCR shows that when the wife left the matrimonial house, both the children were left with the father. Thereafter one child was taken away by the wife. In MAT Appeal No.10/2012 filed by the husband the order dated February 09, 2012 passed by this Court records his concern as father for the child Yash who was taken by the wife to the village. He was studying in Air Force School at Palam, Delhi. The said order reads as under:
‘the only grievance of the appellant is that the child is studying in a village and he wants that the child should study in Air Force School at Palam, Delhi where he was earlier studying. The appellant/husband has also agreed to bear the school expenses of the child apart from maintenance of `6,000/- which he is already paying to the respondent/wife.
He has also stated that he has no objection if the respondent/wife continues to stay in the house of the appellant at Mohan Garden, Uttam Nagar, where she was earlier residing. The learned counsel for appellant has stated that appellant has no objection if custody of child remains with respondent/wife as is ordered by Ld. Trial Court. The respondent is present in person. The counsel for respondent, after taking instructions from her, has stated that the respondent has no objection and has agreed that she will bring the child Yash in Delhi and she has also no objection in staying in the aforesaid accommodation and also sending the child to the Air Force School as per wish of appellant/husband. Appellant/husband has agreed that it will be his responsibility to get the child admitted in the said school.’
16. It is an admitted fact, recorded by the Family Court, in the order on application under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 that the house which was purchased by the husband in Delhi is in use and occupation by the wife since beginning and it is the husband who is residing in a rented accommodation. Thus the allegation made by the wife that he intended to dispossess them from the house, which was purchased by the husband by availing loan facility, is contrary to the factual situation noted in the two orders (i) by the Family Court while disposing of an application under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955; and (ii) by this Court in MAT Appeal No.10/2012.
17. Testimony of PW2 and PW3 proved that when they visited the house of the appellant, they had to face insult and humiliation at the hands of the wife. They were produced by the husband not to prove that his character has been assassinated but to bring on record the conduct of his wife even with the guests visiting their house.
18. So far as character assassination of the husband is concerned, it is a matter of record that such accusations have been made not only in the written statement filed on August 23, 2007 but also thereafter in the FIR registered on December 07, 2007. It may be relevant to refer here that after taking the plea in the written statement that the husband is not only a drunkard but also lives in adultery and failed to perform matrimonial obligations, she pleaded of being harassed after the marriage and physically assaulted for not meeting the dowry demands. The written submissions are just contrary to that. Wherein she projected herself to be a good wife providing right kind of environment to the husband for study and preparing for competition for government job, she could not have done so had she been harassed and physically tortured on above grounds. It may be relevant to mention here that the marriage was solemnised on May 01, 2001 and FIR making such types of allegations was lodged on December 07, 2007, almost after a period of six and a half years of marriage.
19. The averment made in the written statement that the husband and in- laws tried/threatened 
to set her on fire by pouring kerosene oil on her is conspicuously absent in the FIR. Making such type of accusations in the written statement in itself amounts to causing mental cruelty to the husband especially when his entire family has been blamed for giving beatings on non-fulfilment of the dowry demand. The wife has not examined either her father or her Fufa to establish that the alleged demand of `50,000 was fulfilled for arranging a job for the husband nor this fact is pleaded in the written statement. It is a matter of record that he got the job on merits. The husband has education to her sons in a reputed school in Delhi even after the wife left him and continue doing so even after litigation started. Even if all the pleas by the wife are considered to be proved, she could not establish herself to be a victim of matrimonial offence.
20. With a view to examine the correctness of the finding returned by the learned Judge, Family Court that the husband was subjected to cruelty, we have re-appreciated the entire evidence. First of all we may note that plea of the wife that her husband was already married and his first wife committed suicide by jumping into a well, which was concealed at the time of her marriage to the respondent, has not been substantiated by any material – oral or documentary. Suffice it to note here that a case of unnatural death of young bride and that too in a village can never be kept a secret. Such type of unnatural deaths invite penal action. We restrict our discussion only on the under mentioned four grounds for the reason if these grounds are substantiated by the respondent/husband, we need not delve any further:- (1) The wife insulting and humiliating not only the husband and in-laws but also the guests visiting their house.
Apart from the version of PW-1 – the husband, PW-2, Kishan Lal has also stated that on his visit to the house of the parties whenever the appellant/wife was asked to prepare tea, she used to abuse without caring for the presence of the guests. PW-3, Bhagwan Dass visited the house of the parties on the occasion of the birth of their younger son. He has also stated that without bothering for the presence of other guests the wife was abusing the husband that he had not properly invited her parental family. (2) Assassinating the character of the husband as leading an adulterous life and projecting him as drunkard.
Not only in the written statement filed on August 23, 2007 but also in the FIR registered on December 07, 2007 the husband has been accused of having illicit relationship. However, neither in the written statement nor during cross-examination of PW-1 the name of the lady has been disclosed. It may be noted that in the written statement the illicit relationship was stated to be with some women but in the FIR the lady was referred to be a teacher in the same school without disclosing her name. No evidence was led by the respondent/wife to bring on record that some lady was living in the same house along with them as his ‘Dharam Behan’ or that after 3-4 months her husband established illicit relationship with her. She has not led any evidence in support of these allegations or confronted the husband during his cross- examination Legal position is well settled that making of allegations against the spouse assassinating his character amounts to mental cruelty. In the decision reported as (2003) 3SCR 607, Vijaykumar Ramchandra Bhate Vs. Neela Vijaykumar Bhate, the allegations of unchasity and extramarital relations were made by the husband against the wife. The Supreme Court considered it to be constituting mental cruelty and held as under:
‘Levelling disgusting accusations of unchastity and indecent familiarity with a person outside wedlock and allegations of extra-marital relationship is a grave assault on the character, honour, reputation, status as well as the health of the wife.
Such aspersions of perfidiousness attributed to the wife, viewed in context of an educated Indian wife and judged by Indian conditions and standards would amount to worst form of insult and cruelty, sufficient by itself to substantiate cruelty in law, warranting the claim of the wife being allowed. That such allegations made in the written statement or suggested in the course of examination and by way of cross-examination satisfy the requirement of law has also come
to be firmly laid down by the Supreme Court.’ In the instant case the spouse making such allegations is wife who has branded her husband as a drunkard and leading an adulterous life. The effect of such allegations on the state of mind of the husband is reflected in para No.44 of the divorce petition. The husband has pleaded that he felt like committing suicide when his wife made such type of accusations despite he being a non-smoker and teetotaller but desisted for the sake of his son. (3) Accusing the husband and his entire family of treating the wife with physical and mental cruelty on non-fulfilment of the dowry demand.
The marriage between the parties was solemnized on May 01, 2001. For more than six and a half years they lived together initially at his native place, then in Delhi. There was no averment in the written statement of any specific dowry demand being fulfilled. For the first time at the stage of registration of FIR in December, 2007 the allegations were made of fulfilment of the demand of Rs.50,000 to arrange a job for the husband and the money being sent by her father through her uncle (Fufa) Sh. Madan Lal, without even specifying the month/year of meeting the demand. The husband has qualified SSB just after one year of the marriage and is employed as a teacher in MCD school. This shows that he has qualified the competitive examination and got selected on merits. Absence of any such pleading in the written statement filed just four months prior to the registration of FIR is indicative of the falsity of such allegations. We are not informed about the fate of the investigation in the above FIR No. and whether the trial has been concluded or not. In this case we are dealing with the matrimonial offence which is required to be proved on probability and not on the standard of ‘proof beyond reasonable doubt’ as required in a criminal trial. We have drawn the above inference on the basis of averments made in the written statement dated August 23, 2007 and in the FIR dated December 07, 2007.
(4) Performing ‘Tantrik Kriyas‘ through a Tantrik and herself, the acts under the evil spell i.e. attempt being made on the life of the husband repeatedly to strangulate him and attack him with a knife.
In para Nos.38 and 39 of the divorce petition the husband had pleaded about the ‘Tantrik Kriyas’ being performed by the wife through Tantrik as well herself. In para No.45 of the petition the husband has pleaded that one night his wife tried to strangulate him which filled him with terror and shock. In para No.46 of the petition he again pleaded that he was spending sleepless nights worrying about his life and of his son. Another attempt made on his life by his wife was also by trying to strangulate him. His wife appeared to be under some evil spell and was having the knife in her hand at mid-night. He got out of the house and kept roaming on the street, feeling haunted. In the morning when he returned he found his wife missing with both the sons. He informed the incident telephonically to his father-in-law.
21. In the written statement the above averments have been simply denied by the wife.
22. We do not want to delve about motive behind such ‘Tantrik Kriyas’ or the intention behind keeping clove, cardamom and beetle nut under his pillow cover. The question to be decided is whether such acts by the wife constitute mental cruelty. A detailed analysis is available in a well reasoned decision reported as AIR 1961 P&H 125 P.L.Sayal Vs. Smt.Sarla Rani, in which numerous decisions have been cited and discussed on this subject. In the above noted case, it was conceded by the wife that some kind of magical charm or tawij or potion was administered by her to the petitioner/husband sometime in the end of 1951. Thereafter, the husband became ill. Apart from nervous breakdown he suffered various other complications. This was pleaded as an act of cruelty to seek judicial separation under Section 10 of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The petition was dismissed and impugned in appeal bearing FAO No. 72-D/1957 (decided on September 22, 1960).
  
23. The question for determination in the appeal was whether the above act of the wife constitutes such cruelty as to cause a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the husband that it was harmful or injurious for him to live with her. While deliberating on the above subject it was held:-
‘6. Considering the state of mind, the status and the prevailing notions of the strata of society to which the parties belong, the conclusion appears to be irresistible that a state of tension exists between the husband and the wife and the husband, at any rate, is afraid of living with his wife lest such a thing should happen again. Admittedly, the parties are not living together and their marital life has ceased to exist from 1953. It is to be seen in this context whether the conduct of which the petitioner complains comes within the ambit of legal cruelty according to the meaning attached to this word by eminent authorities.
xxxxxx
11. In my judgment, the crucial point to determine is whether there is reasonable apprehension in the mind of the petitioner of a similar act from his spouse in future. The evidence in this case leaves no doubt in my mind about the reality of this fear in the mind of the petitioner. I also think that the fear in the mind of the petitioner, in the context and circumstances of this case, is not groundless and is based on the instinct of self- preservation. He has suffered a great deal from the hands of an ignorant wife and no amount of repentance can undo the wrong that has been wrought. In this situation and state of affairs, it would be futile to expect the petitioner and the respondent to live a normal married life again and it would be a plain denial of justice to keep them within the bonds of marriage.’
24. Reverting to the facts of the instant appeal, we find that the acts of cruelty attributed to the wife have been proved by the husband not only by his own testimony but also by examining two other witnesses who visited their house and left insulted and humiliated. The allegations of dowry demand, physical and mental harassment made by the wife in the written statement and even going to the extent that she was threatened to be set on fire by putting kerosene oil on her are of very serious nature. Most of the allegations made in the written statement including threat to set her on fire are missing in the FIR No.901/07 under Section 498A/406/34 IPC, registered at PS Uttam Nagar just after four months of filing the written statement. The wife has been assassinating the character of the husband by accusing him of having illicit relationship with his colleague or projecting him as an alcoholic without there being even an iota of evidence to establish the above fact even on probabilities. We have unrebutted testimony of the husband that he is a non-smoker, teetotaller and was compelled to walk out of the house fearing threat to his life because of the ‘Tantrik Kriyas’ being performed by his wife. This is sufficient to create fear in his mind about his safety. The husband cannot be made to spend sleepless night fearing for his life.

25. The admitted fact that he purchased a house in Delhi after availing home loan facility and has given to his wife to live there by shifting to a rented accommodation, bearing the maintenance and education expenses of both sons and even ensuring that his children study in a good school in Delhi i.e. Air Force School Delhi reflect that he is a caring father having no intention to sell either the house or intend to dispossess them to settle in life with another lady.
26. The disgusting accusations made by the wife against the husband of he being in illicit relationship, referring him as a drunkard are serious in nature assassinating his character and harming his reputation as a teacher. She has failed to prove any of the above but yet resisting the divorce which if accepted, would make life of the two even more complex and unbearable. The allegations made not only in the written statement but also in the FIR against the husband and his entire family have the effect of causing mental cruelty to him and his entire family. It is now beyond cavil that if a false character assassination allegation is made by either spouse it would invariably constitute matrimonial cruelty to entitle other spouse to seek divorce.
27. The findings recorded by the learned Judge Family Court in our opinion are fully borne out from the material on record and cannot be faulted with. Therefore, the decree of divorce granted by the Family Court has to be upheld.
28. The appeal is dismissed.
29. LCR be sent back alongwith copy of this order.
30. No costs.
PRATIBHA RANI (JUDGE) PRADEEP NANDRAJOG (JUDGE) October 07, 2016
 


Sunday, February 23, 2014

Financially stable wife can’t claim maintenance: Bombay high court

Bombay High Court - Original Judgment
Bombay High Court

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

FAMILY COURT APPEAL NO. 144 OF 2013
IN

M.J.PETITION NO. A - 382 OF 2008 Madhu Gupta ]

Age 61 years, Occ: Housewife ]
Residing at 504, Sheetal `A' Wing ]
Swami Samarth Nagar, ]
Off. Four Bungalows Andheri West ]
Mumbai-400 053 ].. Appellant
(Ori. Respondent)


Vs.


Pravin Kumar Gupta ]
Age 65 years, Retired ]
Residing at 1105, 11th floor ]
Panchavati C.H.S. Ltd. ]
Off Yari Road, Versova ]
Andheri (West), Mumbai-400 061 ]..Respondent
(Ori. Petitioner)

WITH

CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 137 OF 2013
IN
F.C.A.NO. 144 OF 2013
IN
M.J.PETITION NO. A-382 OF 2008
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Bombay High Court

Madhu Gupta ]
Age 61 years, Occ: Housewife ]
Residing at 504, Sheetal `A' Wing ]
Swami Samarth Nagar, ]
Off. Four Bungalows Andheri West ]
Mumbai-400 053 ].. Applicant/Appellant
(Ori. Respondent)
IN THE MATTER BETWEEN:
Madhu Gupta ]
Age 61 years, Occ: Housewife ]
Residing at 504, Sheetal `A' Wing ]
Swami Samarth Nagar, ]
Off. Four Bungalows Andheri West ]
Mumbai-400 053 ].. Appellant
(Ori. Respondent)

Vs.


Pravin Kumar Gupta ]
Age 65 years, Retired ]
Residing at 1105, 11th floor ]
Panchavati C.H.S. Ltd. ]
Off Yari Road, Versova ]
Andheri (West), Mumbai-400 061 ]..Respondent
(Ori. Petitioner)
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Bombay High Court
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WITH
CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 16 OF 2014
IN
F.C.A.NO. 144 OF 2013
Pravin Kumar Gupta ]
1105, 11th floor ]
Panchavati C.H.S. Ltd. ]
Off Yari Road, Versova ]
Andheri (West), Mumbai-400 061 ]
Temporarily Residing at ]
40, Denzil Ave, ]
St. Clair, NSW 2759, ]
Sydney, Australia ]..Applicant/Respondent
IN THE MATTER BETWEEN:
Madhu Gupta ]
504, Sheetal `A' Wing ]
Swami Samarth Nagar, ]
Four Bungalows Andheri West ]
Mumbai-400 053 ].. Appellant
(Ori. Respondent)
Vs.
Pravin Kumar Gupta ]
at 1105, 11th floor ]
Panchavati C.H.S. Ltd. ]
Yari Road, Versova ]
Andheri (West), Mumbai-400 061 ]..Respondent
(Ori. Petitioner)
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.....
Mrs. Mrunalini Deshmukh and Ms. Devika Deshmukh along with
Mr. Mahesh Londhe and Ms. Radha Ved Advocates i/b M/s.
Sanjay Udeshi and Co. for Appellant in FCA No. 144 of 2013 and
Applicant in CAM No. 137 of 2013 and Respondent in CAM No.
16 of 2014
Mr. Dattatray P. Adarkar Advocate for Respondent in FCA No.
144 of 2013 and CAM No. 137 of 2013 and Applicant in CAM
No. 16 of 2014
.....
CORAM : SMT.V.K.TAHILRAMANI AND
SHRI. P.N.DESHMUKH, JJ.
DATED : FEBRUARY 11, 2014
JUDGMENT: [PER SMT. V.K.TAHILRAMANI,J.] :
1 Heard the learned counsel for the appellant-wife and
the learned counsel for the respondent-husband. By consent of
the parties, the matter is taken up for final hearing and
disposal. For the sake of convenience, hereinafter, the
appellant will be referred to as "the wife" and the respondent
will be referred to as "the husband".
2 This Family Court Appeal has been filed by the wife
against the judgment and order dated 22.10.2012 passed in
M.J. Petition No. A-382 of 2008 by the Family Court No.2,
Bandra, Mumbai, whereby her counter-claim for maintenance
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was dismissed. Admitted facts in this matter are that they
have two children i.e. one son Anindya and one daughter. Both
the children are married and they are settled abroad. The
husband had filed a petition for divorce on the ground of
cruelty which came to be dismissed. He has not challenged the
said decision in the petition for divorce. The wife had filed
counter-claim seeking judicial separation and maintenance of
Rs.15,000/- per month. The husband contested the counterclaim
by filing his Written Statement. The husband's petition
for divorce was dismissed on 13.1.2009 by the Family Court.
Thereafter, the wife adduced her evidence claiming for a
decree of judicial separation and maintenance of Rs.15,000/-.
On 13.8.2008, the Family Court exparte decreed the counterclaim
and accordingly decree of judicial separation was passed
and the husband was directed to pay Rs.25,000/- per month as
maintenance to the wife. The husband preferred Misc. Civil
Application for setting aside exparte decree passed on
13.8.2008. However, he did not challenge the decree of
judicial separation and he had only prayed for setting aside the
order relating to the maintenance. Misc. Civil Application was
granted on 19.3.2012. Thus, the decree passed on 13.8.2008
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in relation to maintenance, was set aside by order dated
19.3.2012. Thereafter, the wife led her evidence and the
evidence of her son Anindya and the husband adduced his
evidence.
3 It is well settled law that a wife who has no sufficient
permanent source of income, can only claim and get
maintenance from her husband who is having sufficient means.
The burden lies on the wife to prove that the husband has
refused and neglected to maintain her though he is having
sufficient means. The evidence of the wife and son Anindya
shows that the wife is staying separate since 2007 and the
husband has not given any amount to her towards
maintenance. It is an admitted fact that both the parties are
staying separately since the year 2007. As the decree for
judicial separation was granted in favour of the wife and the
decree of judicial separation has not been challenged by the
husband, on this ground the wife has a right to live separately
from husband. The husband has stated in his evidence that he
is staying in Australia and he is doing part-time work at Local
Community College (Nepean Community College). He has
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further stated that he was teaching three courses based on his
skills in Sales and Computers. Each course is of 8 lecturers of 2
hours duration each. He is paid 500 Australian Dollars post-tax
for the full course. His average monthly income post-tax was
400 Australian Dollars.
4 The learned counsel for the wife produced some
documents to show that the husband was a C.E.O. in XL2WIN
CONSULTANCY PVT. LTD. in Australia The said business is
conducted from 40 Denzil Avenue, St. Clair, NSW 2759. She
pointed out that one other firm i.e. Architectural Drafting and
Design Services also carries out business from the very same
address which shows that the husband is connected with the
said business. In order to support the claim that the husband is
connected with both the businesses, she pointed out that the
address of the said two businesses is the same as the
residential address of the husband. As far as these documents
are concerned, they were not produced before the Family
Court. No evidence was led in respect to these documents.
Even if the said documents are taken into consideration, they
do not show the income of the respondent-husband. Hence,
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these documents would be of no use to the appellant-wife.
5 In considering the prayer for maintenance, two issues
have to be considered viz. (1) whether the husband has
capacity to pay maintenance ? and (2) whether the wife has
any source of income to maintain herself ? The evidence of
the husband shows that he was earning an amount of 400
Australian Dollars per month. The wife has to prove that she
does not have any permanent source of income to maintain
herself. The wife is required to prove that she is not having
any permanent source of income and she is unable to maintain
herself. In order to prove the same, the wife has adduced her
evidence and evidence of her son Anindya. It is pertinent to
note that the wife has not specifically pleaded and stated in her
evidence that she is not having any permanent source of
income and that she is unable to maintain herself. It is further
pertinent to note that she has admitted in her crossexamination
in paragraph 52 that near about Rs.50 lakhs have
been deposited in the Banks as Fixed Deposits. As per Section
58 of the Evidence Act, admitted facts need not be proved.
Even otherwise the learned counsel for the appellant-wife has
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admitted that about Rs.50 lakhs is in the name of the wife in
the Bank. The evidence of the wife clearly shows that the wife
has invested Rs.50 lakhs in the Banks in Fixed Deposits and
she is getting interest on the said Fixed Deposits. In such case,
the appellant-wife could have produced and proved the Fixed
Deposit Certificates and rate of interest which she is getting.
Admittedly, she has not produced the Fixed Deposit
Certificates, therefore, it has not come on record that how
much interest she is getting. It is an admitted fact that the
wife is a senior citizen. In such case, she would get more
interest than the other depositors. If 9% is held to be the rate
of interest, then the wife would get Rs.4,50,000/- per year
which means that she would get Rs.37,500/- per month as
interest on Fixed Deposits of Rs.50 lakhs. The wife has stated
in her cross-examination at paragraph 48 that she is ready to
produce the Statements of Accounts of Mutual Funds standing
in her name alone but she has not produced the Statements of
Accounts of Mutual Funds. This shows that she has also made
investments in Mutual Funds in addition to Fixed Deposits
which clearly stand in her name but she has not produced the
same. If she would have produced the Statements of Accounts
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of Mutual Funds, then it would have gone against her,
therefore, she has not produced the same. In such
circumstances, an adverse inference is required to be drawn
against the appellant-wife and it is required to be held that she
is getting some dividends regularly from the investments made
in the Mutual Funds.
6 The wife has admitted in her evidence that she is
staying in Sheetal Apartment at Andheri, Mumbai. The flat in
Sheetal Apartment at Andheri, according to her, was bought
out of the money put in by her and her husband. The husband
has another flat which is also in Andheri in Panchavati Building.
The learned counsel for the respondent-husband has stated
that the flat has been given exclusively to the wife and she is in
exclusive possession of the same. This fact is admitted by the
learned counsel for the appellant-wife. In such case, there is
no question of giving rent for accommodation to the wife.
7 The learned counsel for the appellant-wife submitted
that though the Family Court had held that the wife has to
incur medical expenses, daily expenses, maintenance of
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society etc. yet, the Family Court has not awarded any
maintenance to the wife. She further pointed out that on
30.11.2013 the wife was required to undergo surgery for both
knees and the expenses for the said surgery came to about
Rs.10,39,000/-. She has further stated that the flat in which
the wife is staying is in dire need of repairs and she has
produced a copy of a letter of the Architect dated 9.1.2004
which shows that the flat needs repairs. Thus, it was submitted
that the wife would be required to incur expenses in relation to
the repairs of the flat also. As far as the documents relating to
the medical expenses for knee replacements are concerned,
the said expenses were incurred on 30.12.2013 which was
after the judgment and decree was passed in the present case.
The judgment and decree in the present case was passed on
22.10.2012 and the events mentioned in the documents have
occurred after the judgment and decree has been passed. In
view of this subsequent developments, the judgment passed
by the learned Judge of the Family Court cannot be faulted.
Similar is the situation in respect of the expenses for repairs of
the flat.
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8 It was contended on behalf of the wife that amount
was siphoned off by the husband from their joint account. The
said amount was about Rs.19,85,641/-. It is interesting to note
that the wife herself had not made any mention about the
same in her evidence. The son Anindya has made some
reference to such fact, however, no witness from the Bank has
been examined to prove that the husband had siphoned off
such amount from the joint account.
9 The learned counsel for the appellant-wife reiterated
time and again that the appellant wife was and is a home
maker and she has no independent source of income. It is also
an admitted fact that the wife has Rs.50 lakhs in Bank
Accounts, obviously, as the wife was not earning, the said
amount of Rs.50 lakhs must have come out of the husband's
earning. Besides the amount of Rs.50 lakhs which is deposited
in the Fixed Deposits in the name of the wife, it may be stated
that the husband had deposited Rs.2,00,000/- by way of
interim maintenance for the wife. The wife was allowed to
withdraw the said amount. She has deposited the said amount
in the Bank as Fixed Deposits which is admitted by her in her
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cross-examination in paragraph 58. If really the wife was in
need of money for her maintenance, then definitely she would
have spent the amount and would not have invested it in Fixed
Deposits in the Bank. This shows that the wife is having
sufficient money for her maintenance. The wife is getting at
least an amount of Rs.37,500/- per month from the Fixed
Deposits. In addition, she is getting some additional amount
of interest on Rs.2,00,000/- which has been invested by her
which was received by her by way of interim maintenance. In
addition to this amount, she is getting some amount by way of
interest on the money she has invested in Mutual Funds. All
these amounts are more than sufficient for her maintenance. It
is seen that the wife is having sufficient permanent source of
income to maintain herself.
10 The learned counsel for the respondent-husband
submitted that the wife is having sufficient means for her
survival and therefore, she is not entitled to get maintenance.
He has placed reliance on the ratio laid down by this Court in
the case of Shehnaz Arvind Mudbhatkal Vs. Arvind
Ramkrishna Mudbhatkal reported in 2011(6) Mh. L. J. 719.
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In the said case, this Court observed that the wife was earning
Rs.45,000/- per month as salary and she has received Rs.11
lakhs as back-wages. Her daughters were not dependent on
her. Therefore, this amount is sufficient to the wife for her
maintenance. This Court observed that in such case, the wife
is not entitled for maintenance from the husband. In the
present case, it is seen that the wife is getting more than
Rs.37,500/- per month as interest. She has more than 50 lakhs
in the bank. In addition, the applicant's son is providing money
for her maintenance and other expenses. No one is dependent
on her. Thus, the facts in the decision relied upon and the
facts in the present case are quite similar and the ratio would
apply to the facts of the present case.
11 Looking to the evidence on record, we are of the
opinion that the Judge of the Family Court has rightly held that
the appellant-wife is having sufficient income for her survival
and she has failed to prove that she is entitled for any
maintenance. Thus, we find no merit in the present Appeal.
Appeal is, therefore, dismissed.
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12 In view of dismissal of the Family Court Appeal, Civil
Application Nos. 137 of 2013 and 16 of 2014 do not survive and
are disposed of as such.
[SHRI. P.N.DESHMUKH, J.] [SMT. V.K.TAHILRAMANI, J.]
kandarkar
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Wednesday, June 26, 2013

Legal Terrorism: A tool to Kill Indian Men

State sponsored 'Legal Terrorism' in action to Kill Indian Men


In India lodging a false case u/s 498-A, DV Act 2005 and 376 IPC is just like ordering a pizza. Large number of females using these legal provision as a tool to settle score with male parteners and their family members after failed marriages. The law is very stringent but is vagure, unfair and easy to misuse, In year 2006 The Supreme Court of India termed these statutory provision as "Legal Terrorism" and asked the Govt of India to amend these provisions. But the Govt of India is still sleeping and did nothing to stop these abuse.

The recent report of India's National Crime Records Bureau(NCRB) reveals 242 male and 129 female suicides a day (Report) . Though the count of male suide is almost double than female, still there is no legal remdy to deal with criminals who force men to commit suicide.

Many young married men are commiting suicide becuase of False 498-A and Domestic Violence cases filed on them by their estranged wives. There is no legal provision to deal with criminals who force men to commit suicide. When a suicide case of young man is reported to police, The police just shifts the body for post-mortem and registered a case under section 174 (Suspicious death) and They do not take any further action to bring the perpetrator of the crime to justice. Hence cases involving men suicide never reach to  courtrooms. Even if somehow a case reaches in court, The courts are very reluctant to deal with men's suicide cases.

On the otherhand if a married woman commit suicide, police directly register the case u/s 498-B and 306 IPC and entire family of husband and his relatives is put behind bars ,When the case related to  suicide of a married woman comes in courts, Indian evidence act section 112-B is applied and husband and his family is presumed as guilty and they have to disprove the entire case. In nutshell, There is no justice for men and they do not have a difnified life and the entire system is treating then unfairly.

http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-saw-135445-suicides-last-year/article4849710.ece

Wednesday, May 27, 2009

HC: Litigant can not ride two horses simultaneously

Ravindra Haribhau Karmarkar vs Mrs. Shaila Ravindra Karmarkar And Another on 17/7/1991

JUDGMENT

1. In the instant application, the substantial question of law, in the
public interest, has been raised and requires decision from this Court.
The substantial question of law raised is as under :

"Whether a Judicial Magistrate First Class trying an application
under Section 125 of Cr.P.C., is obliged under law, to stay the
proceedings, on the ground that a Civil Court of competent
jurisdiction has seized the matter in a suit, in which identical
pleadings are made, and same reliefs are claimed by one and the same
applicant/plaintiff, in whose favour the Magistrate has already
awarded interim maintenance ?"

2. The facts giving rise to the above question of law, in nutshell, are
as under :

The applicant and the non-applicant are the legally married spouses.
Their marriage was solmnised as per the customs and rites of Hindu
Religion, some times in the year 1969 at Buldana. Out of the
wed-lock, they have two issues viz. first issue is a son - Sagar who
is living with the applicant while the second issue a daughter Miss
Anjali is living with the non-applicant No. 1 Mrs. Shaila Karmarkar.
The couple had been to Canada and U.S.A. where they stayed for 12 to
13 years along with their children. Both returned some time in the
year 1984 to India and stayed at Buldana till 1986. During this
period, their relations became strained and ultimately on 19/5/86,
the non-applicant filed an application u/S. 125 of Cr.P.C. against
the applicant for maintenance for her and the daughter. Along with
the application for maintenance, the wife had also filed an
application for interim maintenance @ Rs. 500/- p.m. for both the
non-applicants, on the very day. The learned trial Court, after
hearing the parties and considering the facts, awarded Rs. 250.0
p.m. to the wife and Rs. 150/- p.m. to the daughter, as interim
relief. Since the day of the order, the applicant has paid Rs.
24,000/- to the non-applicants as maintenance allowance and that too
in advance. Mr. Vidwanash, the learned counsel for the applicant
submitted that the applicant has made the payment in advance till
October 1991.

3. On 15th or 16th of October 1986, the non-applicant No. 1 wife filed
a regular Civil Suit No. 227/86 for permanent alimony and also for
arrears of maintenance. Along with the plaint, an application for the
attachment of the property before judgment was also filed. On
28-4-1989, the Joint Civil Judge, Jr. Dn., Buldana passed the following
order on the said application :

"Perused the application and say at Exh. 64. The prayer of the
applicant is that Order of attachment before Judgment be passed or
direct the defendants to furnish solvent surety of Rs. one lakh. By
way of Exh. 64, the defendants showed their willingness to furnish
surety of one lakh. Hence, the defendants are directed to furnish
solvent surety of Rs. one lakh".

In compliance with the above order, on behalf of the defendants, Shri
W. Y. Godbole, resident of Nagpur has furnished the solvent surety
before the Joint Civil Judge, Jr. Dn., Buldana. On 20/3/1991, the
applicant has filed his written statement in the said Civil Suit,
denying the claim of the non-applicants. The case is now posted for
filing the documents.

4. The applicant filed an application to stay the proceedings of Misc.
Criminal Case No. 114/86 before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class,
Buldana, till the decision of the Regular Civil Suit No. 227/86. The
application was opposed. After hearing the parties, the learned
J.M.F.C., Buldana, rejected the application filed by the applicant for
stay of the Misc. Criminal Case No. 114/86 vide his order dated
24-1-1991.

5. Being aggrieved by the order passed by the learned J.M.F.C. Buldana
in Misc. Criminal Case No. 114/86 dated 24-1-1991, the applicant
approached this Court.

6. Mr. Vidwans, the learned counsel for the applicant submitted that
though the non-applicant wife instituted two proceedings, one in the
Criminal Court and another in the Civil Court, but the reliefs are one
and the same. The relief sought in the application u/s. 125 of Cr.P.C.
is to the following effect "to direct the opponent to pay the
subsistence allowance of Rs. 500/- p.m. each to both the applicants
Nos. 1 and 2".

In the Reg. C.S. No. 227/86, the relief claimed as per prayer clause
(i) is that "It is, therefore, prayed that this Hon'ble Court be
pleased to decree the claim of the plaintiffs by passing necessary
orders of maintenance against the defendant, directing him to pay
arrears of Rs. 7000/- to the plaintiffs and further be ordered him
to provide maintenance allowance @ Rs. 500/0 p.m. each to plaintiffs
i.e. total Rs. 1000/- p.m. from the date of filing of this suit and
onwards permanently".

The prayers made in the application u/s. 125 of Cr.P.C. and in the Reg.
C.S. No. 227/86 are one and the same.

7. Mr. Vidwans, the learned counsel for the applicant submitted that
practically pleadings are identical and verbatim in both the cases. He
took me through the pleadings of both cases and demonstrated that
practically the paras are identical as much as they are in verbatim.
Following paras of the application u/S. 125 of Cr.P.C. are identical to
the paras of the plaintiff in Reg. Civil Suit.

Application u/S. 125 Reg. C.S. No. 227/86 of Cr.P.C.

4 6 5 7
6 8 7 9
8 10 9 11
10 12 11 13
12 14 13 15
14 16

Therefore, according to Mr. Vidwans, in both the litigations, the fate
would be based on the same evidence.

8. The findings given by the Civil Court are binding on the Criminal
Court. Therefore, as the matter is seized with the Civil Court i.e. in
respect of the maintenance allowance and that too the similar amount
which she alleged to be entitled in the application u/s. 125 of
Cr.P.C., instead multiplying the litigations and to harass the
applicant to lead the evidence in different two courts, in the interest
of justice, the application pending in the court of J.M.F.C., Buldana
be stayed till the decision in the Reg. C.S. No. 227/86. It is further
submitted that any verdict given by the Criminal Court is not binding
on the Civil Court but it is vice versa. The reliefs being the one and
the same, the evidence will be common, so also the documents, it is the
interest of both the parties to get the verdict from the Civil Court.

9. Mr. Vidwans, the learned counsel for the applicant relied upon the
case of M/s. Bush India Ltd. v. Lekharaj Pohoomal Kewalramani reported
in 1984 Criminal Law Journal 346 (Bombay). Their Lordships observed in
para 7 as follows (at page 348) :

"I fail to understand what is the qualitative difference between the
two stands. The parties are merely formulating the same propositions
in the two proceedings in different words. The distinction made by
the learned Judge is without any difference, as observed by the
learned Magistrate and as is also apparent from the record, the
dispute in the criminal complaint also revolves on the pivot whether
or not respondents are the sole agents of the petitioners for sale
and export of the petitioner's goods to the countries concerned. The
learned Addl. Sessions Judge's interpretation is clearly wrong so
far as this aspect is concerned".

In para 8, Their Lordships observed that :

"The other two reasons given by the learned Magistrate and indicated
in para 6 supra, are also sound and the learned Addl. Judge has not
bothered himself to consider them. The learned Magistrate's order
staying the prosecution was eminently just and the learned Addl.
Sessions Judge should not have interfered with it in revision".

The reliance also been placed on the case of William J. W. Ross v.
Eleanor Agnes Ross reported in AIR 1932 Sind 210 (DB) : (1933 (34) Cri
LJ 548). In that case before their Lordships, the wife instituted the
proceedings u/Ss. 488 and 489 of Cr.P.C. and the husband had already
instituted the proceedings for divorce in the Divorce Corut. Their
Lordships observed that -

"I am of opinion that the learned Magistrate would have exercised a
better discretion on receiving an application u/s. 488 against a
husband who had already instituted proceedings in the divorce Court,
if he had referred the applicant for her remedy to the Civil Court.
I do not think that it was the intention of the legislature in S.
489 to encourage applicants to resort to criminal Courts up to the
very time when an order was passed by a competent Civil Court. As
the Civil Court was seized of the matter, it seems to me clear, it
is better that the Civil Court should dispose of it, and in the
circumstances which have arisen in the present case, I am of opinion
that a High Court would stay proceedings in a criminal Court until
the conclusion of the divorce petition. We accordingly direct the
learned Magistrate to stay the hearing of the application u/s. 488,
Cr.P.C., by adjournment from time to time until the conclusion of
the divorce petition".

10. On behalf of the non-applicants, Mr. Khapre, the learned counsel,
opposed the application and submitted that the remedies in the criminal
Court and Civil Court are altogether different. According to him, the
proceedings instituted in the Criminal Court u/s. 125 of Cr.P.C. are
the summary proceedings for the immediate relief to the wife and other
dependents. In the proceedings u/s 125 Cr.P.C. the Court has
jurisdiction to grant maintenance allowance to extent of Rs. 500/0 to
each claimant. If this amount is inadequate according to clainming
spouse or other claimants, the only remedy available is Civil Suit or
petition u/s. 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.

11. In a case u/S. 125 of Cr.P.C. the non-applicant Smt. Shaila
Karmarkar, entered in the witness box and now the case is posed for her
cross-examination. He further submitted that the principles of res
judicata are not applicable in the instant case because though the
reliefs claimed in both the proceedings are one and the same, the
effect is not one. He further submitted that this Court has no power
under any statute to stay the proceedings. To substantiate his
submissions, he placed reliance on the case of Mohanlal v. Sau.
Kamlabai reported in 1985 II DMC 322 (Bom) (Nagpur Bench, S.B.). In the
case before his Lordship, the wife instituted the proceedings u/s. 125
of Cr.P.C. and also husband filed an application for Judicial
Separation and alimony in the Civil Court against the applicant under
the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act. An ex parte order was passed
against the husband and she was awarded maintenance of Rs. 300/- p.m.
The Civil Court granted Rs. 100/- p.m. as permanent alimony to the
wife. In that case, the issue was raised to the effect that the
principle of res judicate is applicable. His Lordship held that the
Section 11 of the C.P.C. as such, is not, in terms, applicable to the
proceedings u/s. 125 of Cr.P.C.

12. In the instant case before me, the question of res judicata is not
involved. Shri Vidwans, the learned counsel for the applicant also has
not raised this issue. Therefore, the observations made in the case
supra are not of any assistance to the non-applicants.

13. Reliance also been palaced on the case of In re Taralakshmi
Manuprasad reported in AIR 1958 Bom 499 (DB) : (1939 (40) Cri LJ 91).
In that case their Lordships observed that :

"The mere existence of a decree of a Civil Court directing a certain
sum to be paid for maintenance does not oust the jurisdiction of a
Magistrate in a proper case to make an order u/s. 488. Of course the
existence of such a decree is relevant when the Magistrate is
considering what form of order he should make u/s. 488 and the
Magistrate should make it clear in his order that anything paid
under the decree of the Civil Court will be taken into account
against anything which he may order to be paid".

In the instant case before me, there is no decree passed by the Civil
Court. For the same relief, the non-applicant wife knocked the doors of
the Civil Court as well as of Criminal Court. So, the facts of the case
which was before their Lordships of the Bombay High Court are
altogether different having no relation with the facts and
circumstances before me and, therefore, it is also not of any
assistance.

14. Reliance has also been placed on the case of A. Joseph Fernando v.
Maria Navis reported in (1987) II DMC 342 (Madras, S.B.). It is held
that :

"The maintenance proceeding u/s. 125, Cr.P.C. was initiated earlier
though the order in the civil suit was passed earlier. In such
circumstances it is manifest that a petition u/s. 125 of Cr.P.C. is
perfectly maintainable notwithstanding a Civil Court's order for
maintenance. The criminal proceedings can not be quashed".

In the instant application, the applicant has not prayed for quashing
the criminal proceedings i.e. application presented u/s. 125 of Cr.P.C.
The only limited prayer is that the matter being seized with the Civil
Court, till the disposal of the Reg. C.S. No. 227/86, the proceedings
instituted u/s. 125 of Cr.P.C. be stayed. Therefore, the facts of the
case decided by the learned Court in the case supra and the facts
before me, being altogether different, this case is also not of any
assistance to the non-applicants.

15. In a case of Challapalli Sugars Ltd. v. Swadeshi Sugar Supply Pvt.
Ltd. (DB), in respect of the same subject matter,
there were two suits instituted though the relief was based on
different cause of action. The subject-matter in controversy in both
the suits being the same, arises out of the same contract and from the
same transaction, the later suit was stayed till the decision of the
earlier suit.

16. Considering the facts and circumstances and the submissions made by
the learned counsel for the parties, the relief in both the cases,
being one and the same, and the Civil Court being seized with the
matter, in the interest of justice, the proceeding pending in the court
of J.M.F.C. Buldana, be stayed till the decision of the Reg. C.S. No.
277/86.

17. The non-applicants could not be allowed to ride two horses at a
time (two simultaneous proceedings in two different Coruts) and could
not be permitted to continue the maintenance proceedings u/s. 125 of
Cr.P.C. when they had already chosen the alternative remedy in Reg.
C.S. No. 227/86. It is well settled law that the judgment of Civil
Court shall prevail over the judgment of Criminal Court. The natural
justice demands that parallel proceedings cannot be allowed to continue
in different Courts.

18. The Civil Judge, Sr. Dn. Buldana, is directed to expedite the
matter. Staying the proceedings pending in the Court of J.M.F.C.,
Buldana, will not cause any pre-judice to the non-applicants because
they are already receiving the maintenance allowance @ Rs. 250/- p.m.
for wife and Rs. 150/- p.m. for the daughter.

19. In these terms the application is allowed. Rule made absolute.

20. Ordered accordingly.

Sunday, April 13, 2008

Savitri Pandey Vs Prem Chandra Pandey [ SC ]

SAVITRI PANDEY V. PREM CHANDRA PANDEY [2002] RD-SC 8 (8 January 2002)

R.P. Sethi & Y.K. Sabharwal

SETHI,J.

Alleging cruelty and desertion against the husband, the appellant- wife approached the Matrimonial Court under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") praying for dissolution of her marriage with the respondent by a decree of divorce.

She also prayed for direction to the respondent to return her ornaments given to him at the time of marriage. The Family Judge allowed the petition and dissolved the marriage of the parties on the ground of desertion by the husband. The appellant was also granted a decree of Rs.12,000/- towards the price of the scooter, allegedly given at the time of the marriage and payment of Rs.500/- per month as permanent alimony. Both the husband and the wife preferred appeals against the order of the Family Court as the wife was not satisfied with the part of the order refusing to grant a decree in her favour in respect of properties claimed by her and the husband was aggrieved by the order of dissolution of the marriage by a decree of divorce. Both the appeals were disposed of by the impugned order holding that the appellant-wife herself was a defaulting party and neither the allegations of cruelty nor of desertion were proved. The order passed under Section 27 of the Hindu Marriage Act and for permanent alimony was also set aside. The grievance of the appellant-wife is that the High Court was not justified in setting aside the findings of fact arrived at by the Family Court and that she had proved the existence of cruelty and desertion against the respondent. It is contended that as the appellant-wife was proved to have been living separately, it was to be presumed that the respondent had deserted her.

The facts of the case giving rise to the filing of the present appeals are that marriage between the parties was solemnised on 6.5.1987. The appellant-wife lived with the respondent-husband till 21st June, 1987 and according to her the marriage between the parties was never consummated. After 21st June, 1987 the parties started living separately. The appellant alleged that her parents spent more than Rs.80,000/- with respect to the ceremonies of the marriage and also gave several articles in the form of ornaments, valuables, cash and kind as per demand of the respondent. The respondent and his family members allegedly made further demands of Colour TV, Refrigerator and some other ornaments besides hard cash of Rs.10,000/-. The father of the appellant obliged the respondent by giving him Rs.10,000/- in the first week of June, 1987 but could not fulfil the other demands of his parents. The respondent and his family members were alleged to have started torturing the appellants on false pretexts. Aggrieved by the attitude of the respondent and his family members, the appellant states to have filed a petition under Section 13 of the Act seeking dissolution of marriage by a decree of divorce along with prayer for the return of the property and grant of permanent alimony. The respondent also filed a petition seeking divorce and grant of other reliefs. However, on 14.5.1996 the respondent filed an application for withdrawal of his matrimonial case which was allowed on 19.5.1996. The appellant had alleged that the respondent was having illicit relations with a lady residing in Gaya at Bihar with whom he was stated to have solemnised the marriage. The allegations made in the petition were denied by the respondent and it was stated that in fact the appellant-wife was taking advantage of her own wrongs.

On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed:

"1. Whether the defendant has treated the petitioner with cruelty? If so, its effect?

2. Whether the petitioner is entitled to relief under Sec.27 of the Hindu Marriage Act? If so, its effect?

3. Whether the defendant is entitled to any relief? If so, its effect?

4. To what relief, parties are entitled?" It may be noticed that no issue with regard to alleged desertion was insisted to be framed. With respect to the issue of cruelty, the Family Court concluded that no evidence had been led to prove the allegations. The Court, however, held: "but it is proved that the respondent had deserted the petitioner, hence the petitioner will get or is entitled to for a decree of divorce". On appreciation of evidence led in the case, the Division Bench of the High Court held:

"We also do not find any evidence that the wife has been treated with cruelty by the husband. We are also of the view that there is no evidence that petitioner is deserted." We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

Treating the petitioner with cruelty is a ground for divorce under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Act. Cruelty has not been defined under the Act but in relation to matrimonial matters it is contemplated as a conduct of such type which endangers the living of the petitioner with the respondent. Cruelty consists of acts which are dangerous to life, limb or health. Cruelty for the purpose of the Act means where one spouse has so treated the other and manifested such feelings towards her or him as to have inflicted bodily injury, or to have caused reasonable apprehension of bodily injury, suffering or to have injured health.

Cruelty may be physical or mental. Mental cruelty is the conduct of other spouse which causes mental suffering or fear to the matrimonial life of the other. "Cruelty", therefore, postulates a treatment of the petitioner with such cruelty as to cause a reasonable apprehension in his or her mind that it would be harmful or injurious for the petitioner to live with the other party. Cruelty, however, has to be distinguished from the ordinary wear and tear of family life. It cannot be decided on the basis of the sensitivity of the petitioner and has to be adjudged on the basis of the course of conduct which would, in general, be dangerous for a spouse to live with the other. In the instant case both the trial court as well as the High Court have found on facts that the wife had failed to prove the allegations of cruelty attributed to the respondent.

Concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the courts cannot be disturbed by this Court in exercise of powers under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. Otherwise also the averments made in the petition and the evidence led in support thereof clearly shows that the allegations, even if held to have been proved, would only show the sensitivity of the appellant with respect to the conduct of the respondent which cannot be termed more than ordinary wear and tear of the family life.

No decree of divorce could be granted on the ground of desertion in the absence of pleading and proof. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that even in the absence of specific issue, the parties had led evidence and there was sufficient material for the Family Court to return a verdict of desertion having been proved. In the light of the submissions made by the learned counsel, we have opted to examine this aspect of the matter despite the fact that there was no specific issue framed or insisted to be framed.

"Desertion", for the purpose of seeking divorce under the Act, means the intentional permanent forsaking and abandonment of one spouse by the other without that other's consent and without reasonable cause.

In other words it is a total repudiation of the obligations of marriage.

Desertion is not the withdrawal from a place but from a state of things.

Desertion, therefore, means withdrawing from the matrimonial obligations, i.e., not permitting or allowing and facilitating the cohabitation between the parties. The proof of desertion has to be considered by taking into consideration the concept of marriage which in law legalises the sexual relationship between man and woman in the society for the perpetuation of race, permitting lawful indulgence in passion to prevent licentiousness and for procreation of children.

Desertion is not a single act complete in itself, it is a continuous course of conduct to be determined under the facts and circumstances of each case. After referring to host of authorities and the views of various authors, this Court in Bipinchandra Jaisinghbhai Shah v.

Prabhavati [AIR 1957 SC 176] held that if a spouse abandons the other in a state of temporary passions, for example, anger or disgust without intending permanently to cease cohabitation, it will not amount to desertion. It further held:

"For the office of desertion, so far as the deserting spouse is concerned, two essential conditions must be there, namely (1) the factum of separation, and (2) the intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end (animus deserendi).

Similarly two elements are essential so far as the deserted spouse is concerned: (1) the absence of consent, and (2) absence of conduct giving reasonable cause to the spouse leaving the matrimonial home to form the necessary intention aforesaid. The petitioner for divorce bears the burden of proving those elements in the two spouses respectively.

Here a different between the English law and the law as enacted by the Bombay Legislature may be pointed out.

Whereas under the English law those essential conditions must continue throughout the course of the three years immediately preceding the institution of the suit for divorce, under the Act, the period is four years without specifying that it should immediately precede the commencement of proceedings for divorce. Whether the omission of the last clause has any practical result need not detain us, as it does not call for decision in the present case. Desertion is a matter of inference to be drawn from the facts and circumstances of each case. The inference may be drawn from certain facts which may not in another case be capable of leading to the same inference;

that is to say, the facts have to be viewed as to the purpose which is revealed by those acts or by conduct and expression of intention, both anterior and subsequent to the actual acts of separation. If, in fact, there has been a separation, the essential question always is whether that act could be attributable to an animus deserendi. The offence of desertion commences when the fact of separation and the animus deserendi co-exist. But it is not necessary that they should commence at the same time. The de facto separation may have commenced without the necessary animus ort it may be that the separation and the animus deserendi coincide in point of time; for example, when the separating spouse abandons the marital home with the intention, express or implied, of bringing cohabitation permanently to a close.

The law in England has prescribed a three years period and the Bombay Act prescribed a period of four years as a continuous period during which the two elements must subsist. Hence, if a deserting spouse takes advantage of the locus poenitentiae thus provided by law and decide to come back to the deserted spouse by a bona fide offer of resuming the matrimonial home with all the implications of marital life, before the statutory period is out or even after the lapse of that period, unless proceedings for divorce have been commenced, desertion comes to an end and if the deserted spouse unreasonably refuses to offer, the latter may be in desertion and not the former. Hence it is necessary that during all the period that there has been a desertion, the deserted spouse must affirm the marriage and be ready and willing to resume married life on such conditions as may be reasonable. It is also well settled that in proceedings for divorce the plaintiff must prove the offence of desertion, like and other matrimonial offence, beyond all reasonable doubt. Hence, though corroboration is not required as an absolute rule of law the courts insist upon corroborative evidence, unless its absence is accounted for to the satisfaction of the court." Following the decision in Bipinchandra's case (supra) this Court again reiterated the legal position in Lachman Utamchand Kirpalani v.

Meena alias Mota [AIR 1964 SC 40] by holding that in its essence desertion means the intentional permanent forsaking and abandonment of one spouse by the other without that other's consent, and without reasonable cause. For the offence of desertion so far as deserting spouse is concerned, two essential conditions must be there (1) the factum of separation and (2) the intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end (animus deserendi). Similarly two elements are essential so far as the deserted spouse is concerned: (1) the absence of consent, and (2) absence of conduct giving reasonable cause to the spouse leaving the matrimonial home to form the necessary intention aforesaid. For holding desertion proved the inference may be drawn from certain facts which may not in another case be capable of leading to the same inference; that is to say the facts have to be viewed as to the purpose which is revealed by those acts or by conduct and expression of intention, both anterior and subsequent to the actual acts of separation.

To prove desertion in matrimonial matter it is not always necessary that one of the spouse should have left the company of the other as desertion could be proved while living under the same roof.

Desertion cannot be equated with separate living by the parties to the marriage. Desertion may also be constructive which can be inferred from the attending circumstances. It has always to be kept in mind that the question of desertion is a matter of inference to be drawn from the facts and circumstances of each case.

There is another aspect of the matter which disentitles the appellant from seeking the relief of divorce on the ground of desertion in this case. As desertion in matrimonial cases means the withdrawal of one party from a state of things, i.e., a marital status of the party, no party to the marriage can be permitted to allege desertion unless he or she admits that after the formal ceremonies of the marriage, the parties had recognised and discharged the common obligation of the married life which essentially requires the cohabitation between the parties for the purpose of consummating the marriage. Cohabitation by the parties is an essential of a valid marriage as the object of the marriage is to further the perpetuation of the race by permitting lawful indulgence in passions for procreation of children. In other words, there can be no desertion without previous cohabitation by the parties.

The basis for this theory is built upon the recognised position of law in matrimonial matters that no-one can desert who does not actively or wilfully bring to an end the existing state of cohabitation. However, such a rule is subject to just exceptions which may be found in a case on the ground of mental or physical incapacity or other peculiar circumstances of the case. However, the party seeking divorce on the ground of desertion is required to show that he or she was not taking the advantage of his or her own wrong.

In the instant case the appellant herself pleaded that there had not been cohabitation between the parties after the marriage. She neither assigned any reason nor attributed the non-resumption of cohabitation to the respondent. From the pleadings and evidence led in the case, it is apparent that the appellant did not permit the respondent to have cohabitation for consummating the marriage. In the absence of cohabitation between the parties, a particular state of matrimonial position was never permitted by the appellant to come into existence. In the present case, in the absence of cohabitation and consummation of marriage, the appellant was disentitled to claim divorce on the ground of desertion.

No evidence was led by the appellant to show that she was forced to leave the company of the respondent or that she was thrown away from the matrimonial home or that she was forced to live separately and that the respondent had intended animus deserendi. There is nothing on record to hold that the respondent had ever declared to bring the marriage to an end or refuses to have cohabitation with the appellant.

As a mater of fact the appellant is proved to have abandoned the matrimonial home and declined to cohabit with the respondent thus forbearing to perform the matrimonial obligation.

In any proceedings under the Act whether defended or not the court would decline to grant relief to the petitioner if it is found that the petitioner was taking advantage of his or her own wrong or disability for the purposes of the reliefs contemplated under Section 23(1) of the Act. No party can be permitted to carve out the ground for destroying the family which is the basic unit of the society. The foundation of the family rests on the institution of a legal and valid marriage.

Approach of the court should be to preserve the matrimonial home and be reluctant to dissolve the marriage on the asking of one of the parties.

For upholding the judgment and decree of the Family Court, Shri Dinesh Kumar Garg, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that as after the decree of divorce the appellant had remarried with one Sudhakar Pandey and out of the second marriage a child is also stated to have been born, it would be in the interest of justice and the parties that the marriage between them is dissolved by a decree of divorce. In support of his contention he has relied upon judgments of this Court in Anita Sabharwal v. Anil Sabharwal [1997 (11) SCC 490], Shashi Garg (Smt.) v. Arun Garg[1997 (7) SCC 565], Ashok Hurra v. Rupa Bipin Zaveri [1997 (4) SCC 226] and Madhuri Mehta v. Meet Verma [1997 (11) SCC 81].

To appreciate such a submission some facts have to be noticed and the interests of public and society to be borne in mind. It appears that the marriage between the parties was dissolved by a decree of divorce vide the judgment and decree of the Family Court dated 8.7.1996.

The respondent-husband filed appeal against the judgment and decree on 19.1.1997. As no stay was granted, the appellant solemnised the second marriage on 29.5.1997, admittedly, during the pendency of the appeal before the High Court. There is no denial of the fact that right of at least one appeal is a recognised right under all systems of civilised legal jurisprudence. If despite the pendency of the appeal, the appellant chose to solemnise the second marriage, the adventure is deemed to have been undertaken at her own risk and the ultimate consequences arising of the judgment in the appeal pending in the High Court. No person can be permitted to flout the course of justice by his or her overt and covert acts. The facts of the cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant are distinct having no proximity with the facts of the present case. In all the cases relied upon by the appellant and referred to hereinabove, the marriage between the parties was dissolved by a decree of divorce by mutual consent in terms of application under Section 13B of the Act. This Court while allowing the applications filed under Section 13B took into consideration the circumstances of each case and granted the relief on the basis of compromise. Almost in all cases the other side was duly compensated by the grant of lumpsum amount and permanent provision regarding maintenance.

This Court in Ms.Jorden Diengdeh v. S.S. Chopra [AIR 1985 SC 935] suggested for a complete reform of law of marriage and to make a uniform law applicable to all people irrespective of religion or caste.

The Court observed:

"It appears to be necessary to introduce irretrievable breakdown of marriage and mutual consent as grounds of divorce in all cases. .... There is no point or purpose to be served by the continuance of a marriage which has so completely and signally broken down. We suggest that the time has come for the intervention of legislature in these matters to provide for a uniform code of marriage and divorce and to provide by law for a way out of the unhappy situation in which couples like the present have found themselves.

Marriage between the parties cannot be dissolved only on the averments made by one of the parties that as the marriage between them has broken down, no useful purpose would be served to keep it alive.

The legislature, in its wisdom, despite observation of this Court has not thought it proper to provide for dissolution of the marriage on such averments. There may be cases where, on facts, it is found that as the marriage has become dead on account of contributory acts of commission and omission of the parties, no useful purpose would be served by keeping such marriage alive. The sanctity of marriage cannot be left at the whims of one of the annoying spouses. This Court in V. Bhagat v.

Mrs.D.Bhagat [AIR 1994 SC 710] held that irretrievable breakdown of the marriage is not a ground by itself to dissolve it.

As already held, the appellant herself is trying to take advantage of her own wrong and in the circumstances of the case, the marriage between the parties cannot be held to have become dead for invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution for dissolving the marriage.

At this stage we would like to observe that the period of limitation prescribed for filing the appeal under Section 28(4) is apparently inadequate which facilitates the frustration of the marriages by the unscrupulous litigant spouses. In a vast country like ours, the powers under the Act are generally exercisable by the District Court and the first appeal has to be filed in the High Court. The distance, the geographical conditions, the financial position of the parties and the time required for filing a regular appeal, if kept in mind, would certainly show that the period of 30 days prescribed for filing the appeal is insufficient and inadequate. In the absence of appeal, the other party can solemnise the marriage and attempt to frustrate the appeal right of the other side as appears to have been done in the instant case. We are of the opinion that a minimum period of 90 days may be prescribed for filing the appeal against any judgment and decree under the Act and any marriage solemnised during the aforesaid period be deemed to be void. Appropriate legislation is required to be made in this regard. We direct the Registry that the copy of this judgment may be forwarded to the Ministry of Law & Justice for such action as it may deem fit to take in this behalf.

There is no merit in these appeals which are dismissed with costs throughout.

.......................J.

(R.P. SETHI) .......................J.