Showing posts with label DV Act 2005. Show all posts
Showing posts with label DV Act 2005. Show all posts

Wednesday, June 26, 2013

Legal Terrorism: A tool to Kill Indian Men

State sponsored 'Legal Terrorism' in action to Kill Indian Men


In India lodging a false case u/s 498-A, DV Act 2005 and 376 IPC is just like ordering a pizza. Large number of females using these legal provision as a tool to settle score with male parteners and their family members after failed marriages. The law is very stringent but is vagure, unfair and easy to misuse, In year 2006 The Supreme Court of India termed these statutory provision as "Legal Terrorism" and asked the Govt of India to amend these provisions. But the Govt of India is still sleeping and did nothing to stop these abuse.

The recent report of India's National Crime Records Bureau(NCRB) reveals 242 male and 129 female suicides a day (Report) . Though the count of male suide is almost double than female, still there is no legal remdy to deal with criminals who force men to commit suicide.

Many young married men are commiting suicide becuase of False 498-A and Domestic Violence cases filed on them by their estranged wives. There is no legal provision to deal with criminals who force men to commit suicide. When a suicide case of young man is reported to police, The police just shifts the body for post-mortem and registered a case under section 174 (Suspicious death) and They do not take any further action to bring the perpetrator of the crime to justice. Hence cases involving men suicide never reach to  courtrooms. Even if somehow a case reaches in court, The courts are very reluctant to deal with men's suicide cases.

On the otherhand if a married woman commit suicide, police directly register the case u/s 498-B and 306 IPC and entire family of husband and his relatives is put behind bars ,When the case related to  suicide of a married woman comes in courts, Indian evidence act section 112-B is applied and husband and his family is presumed as guilty and they have to disprove the entire case. In nutshell, There is no justice for men and they do not have a difnified life and the entire system is treating then unfairly.

http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-saw-135445-suicides-last-year/article4849710.ece

Sunday, February 20, 2011

NBW cannot be issued for non payment of maintenance

N THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

Crl.MC.No. 4843 of 2010()



1. SHANAVAS, S/O.ABDULSALAM,

… Petitioner

Vs



1. RASEENA, D/O.SHIHABUDEEN,

… Respondent

2. STATE OF KERALA,

For Petitioner :SRI.AYYAPPAN SANKAR For Respondent : No Appearance

The Hon’ble MR. Justice M.SASIDHARAN NAMBIAR Dated :10/12/2010

O R D E R

M.Sasidharan Nambiar, J.

————————–

Crl.M.C.No.4843 of 2010

————————–

ORDER

First respondent, through her mother, filed petition under Section 12 of Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act before Judicial First Class Magistrate’s Court-II, Thiruvananthapuram, which was numbered as M.C.No.246/2010. First respondent also filed a petition for interim order under Section 23 of Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act. By Annexure-II ex parte order dated 24.9.2010, respondents therein were restrained from committing any sort of domestic violence against the first respondent herein. Petitioner, the first respondent therein, was directed to appear before the court on 7.10.2010 and surrender his passport. He was also directed to pay Rs.1,500/- per month towards maintenance to the aggrieved person. Notice was ordered to the respondents therein, including the petitioner. Petitioner, along with the third respondent, challenged that order before Sessions Court, Thiruvananthapuram in Crl.A.No.758/2010. It is pending. They also sought an order staying Annexure-II order. By Annexure-IV order, learned Sessions Judge stayed only the direction to surrender the passport. Annexure-VI, copy of the proceedings paper in M.C.No. 246/2010, shows that case was posted to 19.10.2010 and on that day, learned Magistrate directed the petitioner to appear in person and pay maintenance. On that day, case was posted to 2.11.2010. On 2.11.2010, petitioner was absent. The case was then posted to 18.11.2010. On 18.11.2010 recording that petitioner was absent and there was no payment of interim maintenance ordered, non bailable warrant returnable on 9.12.2010 was issued. This petition is filed under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure for a direction to the learned Magistrate to dispose the petition filed under Section 12 of Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act expeditiously and to stay the order issuing non bailable warrant.

2. In the light of the order to be passed in this petition, it is not necessary to issue notice to the first respondent.

3. Section 23(1) of Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act provides that in any proceeding before the Magistrate, he may pass such interim order as he deems just and proper. Sub-section (2) provides that if the Magistrate is satisfied that an application prima facie discloses that respondent is committing or has committed an act of domestic violence or that there is likelihood that respondent may commit an act of domestic violence, he may grant an ex parte order on the basis of the affidavit in such form, as may be prescribed, of the aggrieved person under Sections 18, 19, 20, 21 or 22 against the respondent.

4. Section 31 of Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act provides for penalty for breach of protection order. Under sub-section (1), a breach of protection order or of an interim protection order by the respondent shall be an offence and shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year or fine or both. Section 32 provides that notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, the offence under sub-section (1) of Section 31 shall be cognizable and non bailable.

5. As is clear from Section 31 of Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, when an order under Section 23, whether under sub-section (1) on hearing the respondent or under sub-section (2), an ex parte interim protection order, was passed and respondent commits breach of that order, respondent is punishable as provided under sub-section (1) of Section 31. That offence, as provided under Section 32 of Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act is non bailable and cognizable. But the cognizable offence provided under Section 31(1) would only be the result of a breach of the protection order as provided under Section 18 of Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act.

6. A Magistrate, on passing an order under Section 23(1) or an ex parte order under Section 23(2) of Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, cannot direct arrest of the respondent by issuing non bailable warrant before taking cognizance of the offence, if an offence is committed under sub-section (1) of Section

31. Annexure-VI proceeding paper shows that after passing Annexure-II ex parte order as provided under sub-section (2) of Section 23 of Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, the petition filed by the first respondent under Section 12 of Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act was posted for the appearance of the respondents. When first respondent appeared through a counsel, he was directed to appear in person and pay the maintenance. It is on the failure to appear and pay maintenance as ordered, the non bailable warrant was issued. Learned Magistrate cannot order non bailable warrant for the failure to pay maintenance as has been done in this case. It is made clear that Magistrate can proceed against the petitioner or other respondents for non payment of the interim maintenance only as provided under Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act and such an order cannot be enforced as has been done by the learned Magistrate. In such circumstances, the order issuing non bailable warrant can only be quashed. Petition is allowed. The order issuing non bailable warrant against the petitioner in M.C.No. 246/2010 is quashed. Judicial First Class Magistrate- II, Thiruvananthapuram is directed to dispose the petition filed under Section 12 of Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, on merits, expeditiously. It is also made clear that learned Magistrate is competent to execute Annexure-II order passed under Section 23(2) of Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, in accordance with the provisions of the Act.

10th December, 2010 (M.Sasidharan Nambiar, Judge) tkv

Wednesday, May 27, 2009

HC: Litigant can not ride two horses simultaneously

Ravindra Haribhau Karmarkar vs Mrs. Shaila Ravindra Karmarkar And Another on 17/7/1991

JUDGMENT

1. In the instant application, the substantial question of law, in the
public interest, has been raised and requires decision from this Court.
The substantial question of law raised is as under :

"Whether a Judicial Magistrate First Class trying an application
under Section 125 of Cr.P.C., is obliged under law, to stay the
proceedings, on the ground that a Civil Court of competent
jurisdiction has seized the matter in a suit, in which identical
pleadings are made, and same reliefs are claimed by one and the same
applicant/plaintiff, in whose favour the Magistrate has already
awarded interim maintenance ?"

2. The facts giving rise to the above question of law, in nutshell, are
as under :

The applicant and the non-applicant are the legally married spouses.
Their marriage was solmnised as per the customs and rites of Hindu
Religion, some times in the year 1969 at Buldana. Out of the
wed-lock, they have two issues viz. first issue is a son - Sagar who
is living with the applicant while the second issue a daughter Miss
Anjali is living with the non-applicant No. 1 Mrs. Shaila Karmarkar.
The couple had been to Canada and U.S.A. where they stayed for 12 to
13 years along with their children. Both returned some time in the
year 1984 to India and stayed at Buldana till 1986. During this
period, their relations became strained and ultimately on 19/5/86,
the non-applicant filed an application u/S. 125 of Cr.P.C. against
the applicant for maintenance for her and the daughter. Along with
the application for maintenance, the wife had also filed an
application for interim maintenance @ Rs. 500/- p.m. for both the
non-applicants, on the very day. The learned trial Court, after
hearing the parties and considering the facts, awarded Rs. 250.0
p.m. to the wife and Rs. 150/- p.m. to the daughter, as interim
relief. Since the day of the order, the applicant has paid Rs.
24,000/- to the non-applicants as maintenance allowance and that too
in advance. Mr. Vidwanash, the learned counsel for the applicant
submitted that the applicant has made the payment in advance till
October 1991.

3. On 15th or 16th of October 1986, the non-applicant No. 1 wife filed
a regular Civil Suit No. 227/86 for permanent alimony and also for
arrears of maintenance. Along with the plaint, an application for the
attachment of the property before judgment was also filed. On
28-4-1989, the Joint Civil Judge, Jr. Dn., Buldana passed the following
order on the said application :

"Perused the application and say at Exh. 64. The prayer of the
applicant is that Order of attachment before Judgment be passed or
direct the defendants to furnish solvent surety of Rs. one lakh. By
way of Exh. 64, the defendants showed their willingness to furnish
surety of one lakh. Hence, the defendants are directed to furnish
solvent surety of Rs. one lakh".

In compliance with the above order, on behalf of the defendants, Shri
W. Y. Godbole, resident of Nagpur has furnished the solvent surety
before the Joint Civil Judge, Jr. Dn., Buldana. On 20/3/1991, the
applicant has filed his written statement in the said Civil Suit,
denying the claim of the non-applicants. The case is now posted for
filing the documents.

4. The applicant filed an application to stay the proceedings of Misc.
Criminal Case No. 114/86 before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class,
Buldana, till the decision of the Regular Civil Suit No. 227/86. The
application was opposed. After hearing the parties, the learned
J.M.F.C., Buldana, rejected the application filed by the applicant for
stay of the Misc. Criminal Case No. 114/86 vide his order dated
24-1-1991.

5. Being aggrieved by the order passed by the learned J.M.F.C. Buldana
in Misc. Criminal Case No. 114/86 dated 24-1-1991, the applicant
approached this Court.

6. Mr. Vidwans, the learned counsel for the applicant submitted that
though the non-applicant wife instituted two proceedings, one in the
Criminal Court and another in the Civil Court, but the reliefs are one
and the same. The relief sought in the application u/s. 125 of Cr.P.C.
is to the following effect "to direct the opponent to pay the
subsistence allowance of Rs. 500/- p.m. each to both the applicants
Nos. 1 and 2".

In the Reg. C.S. No. 227/86, the relief claimed as per prayer clause
(i) is that "It is, therefore, prayed that this Hon'ble Court be
pleased to decree the claim of the plaintiffs by passing necessary
orders of maintenance against the defendant, directing him to pay
arrears of Rs. 7000/- to the plaintiffs and further be ordered him
to provide maintenance allowance @ Rs. 500/0 p.m. each to plaintiffs
i.e. total Rs. 1000/- p.m. from the date of filing of this suit and
onwards permanently".

The prayers made in the application u/s. 125 of Cr.P.C. and in the Reg.
C.S. No. 227/86 are one and the same.

7. Mr. Vidwans, the learned counsel for the applicant submitted that
practically pleadings are identical and verbatim in both the cases. He
took me through the pleadings of both cases and demonstrated that
practically the paras are identical as much as they are in verbatim.
Following paras of the application u/S. 125 of Cr.P.C. are identical to
the paras of the plaintiff in Reg. Civil Suit.

Application u/S. 125 Reg. C.S. No. 227/86 of Cr.P.C.

4 6 5 7
6 8 7 9
8 10 9 11
10 12 11 13
12 14 13 15
14 16

Therefore, according to Mr. Vidwans, in both the litigations, the fate
would be based on the same evidence.

8. The findings given by the Civil Court are binding on the Criminal
Court. Therefore, as the matter is seized with the Civil Court i.e. in
respect of the maintenance allowance and that too the similar amount
which she alleged to be entitled in the application u/s. 125 of
Cr.P.C., instead multiplying the litigations and to harass the
applicant to lead the evidence in different two courts, in the interest
of justice, the application pending in the court of J.M.F.C., Buldana
be stayed till the decision in the Reg. C.S. No. 227/86. It is further
submitted that any verdict given by the Criminal Court is not binding
on the Civil Court but it is vice versa. The reliefs being the one and
the same, the evidence will be common, so also the documents, it is the
interest of both the parties to get the verdict from the Civil Court.

9. Mr. Vidwans, the learned counsel for the applicant relied upon the
case of M/s. Bush India Ltd. v. Lekharaj Pohoomal Kewalramani reported
in 1984 Criminal Law Journal 346 (Bombay). Their Lordships observed in
para 7 as follows (at page 348) :

"I fail to understand what is the qualitative difference between the
two stands. The parties are merely formulating the same propositions
in the two proceedings in different words. The distinction made by
the learned Judge is without any difference, as observed by the
learned Magistrate and as is also apparent from the record, the
dispute in the criminal complaint also revolves on the pivot whether
or not respondents are the sole agents of the petitioners for sale
and export of the petitioner's goods to the countries concerned. The
learned Addl. Sessions Judge's interpretation is clearly wrong so
far as this aspect is concerned".

In para 8, Their Lordships observed that :

"The other two reasons given by the learned Magistrate and indicated
in para 6 supra, are also sound and the learned Addl. Judge has not
bothered himself to consider them. The learned Magistrate's order
staying the prosecution was eminently just and the learned Addl.
Sessions Judge should not have interfered with it in revision".

The reliance also been placed on the case of William J. W. Ross v.
Eleanor Agnes Ross reported in AIR 1932 Sind 210 (DB) : (1933 (34) Cri
LJ 548). In that case before their Lordships, the wife instituted the
proceedings u/Ss. 488 and 489 of Cr.P.C. and the husband had already
instituted the proceedings for divorce in the Divorce Corut. Their
Lordships observed that -

"I am of opinion that the learned Magistrate would have exercised a
better discretion on receiving an application u/s. 488 against a
husband who had already instituted proceedings in the divorce Court,
if he had referred the applicant for her remedy to the Civil Court.
I do not think that it was the intention of the legislature in S.
489 to encourage applicants to resort to criminal Courts up to the
very time when an order was passed by a competent Civil Court. As
the Civil Court was seized of the matter, it seems to me clear, it
is better that the Civil Court should dispose of it, and in the
circumstances which have arisen in the present case, I am of opinion
that a High Court would stay proceedings in a criminal Court until
the conclusion of the divorce petition. We accordingly direct the
learned Magistrate to stay the hearing of the application u/s. 488,
Cr.P.C., by adjournment from time to time until the conclusion of
the divorce petition".

10. On behalf of the non-applicants, Mr. Khapre, the learned counsel,
opposed the application and submitted that the remedies in the criminal
Court and Civil Court are altogether different. According to him, the
proceedings instituted in the Criminal Court u/s. 125 of Cr.P.C. are
the summary proceedings for the immediate relief to the wife and other
dependents. In the proceedings u/s 125 Cr.P.C. the Court has
jurisdiction to grant maintenance allowance to extent of Rs. 500/0 to
each claimant. If this amount is inadequate according to clainming
spouse or other claimants, the only remedy available is Civil Suit or
petition u/s. 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.

11. In a case u/S. 125 of Cr.P.C. the non-applicant Smt. Shaila
Karmarkar, entered in the witness box and now the case is posed for her
cross-examination. He further submitted that the principles of res
judicata are not applicable in the instant case because though the
reliefs claimed in both the proceedings are one and the same, the
effect is not one. He further submitted that this Court has no power
under any statute to stay the proceedings. To substantiate his
submissions, he placed reliance on the case of Mohanlal v. Sau.
Kamlabai reported in 1985 II DMC 322 (Bom) (Nagpur Bench, S.B.). In the
case before his Lordship, the wife instituted the proceedings u/s. 125
of Cr.P.C. and also husband filed an application for Judicial
Separation and alimony in the Civil Court against the applicant under
the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act. An ex parte order was passed
against the husband and she was awarded maintenance of Rs. 300/- p.m.
The Civil Court granted Rs. 100/- p.m. as permanent alimony to the
wife. In that case, the issue was raised to the effect that the
principle of res judicate is applicable. His Lordship held that the
Section 11 of the C.P.C. as such, is not, in terms, applicable to the
proceedings u/s. 125 of Cr.P.C.

12. In the instant case before me, the question of res judicata is not
involved. Shri Vidwans, the learned counsel for the applicant also has
not raised this issue. Therefore, the observations made in the case
supra are not of any assistance to the non-applicants.

13. Reliance also been palaced on the case of In re Taralakshmi
Manuprasad reported in AIR 1958 Bom 499 (DB) : (1939 (40) Cri LJ 91).
In that case their Lordships observed that :

"The mere existence of a decree of a Civil Court directing a certain
sum to be paid for maintenance does not oust the jurisdiction of a
Magistrate in a proper case to make an order u/s. 488. Of course the
existence of such a decree is relevant when the Magistrate is
considering what form of order he should make u/s. 488 and the
Magistrate should make it clear in his order that anything paid
under the decree of the Civil Court will be taken into account
against anything which he may order to be paid".

In the instant case before me, there is no decree passed by the Civil
Court. For the same relief, the non-applicant wife knocked the doors of
the Civil Court as well as of Criminal Court. So, the facts of the case
which was before their Lordships of the Bombay High Court are
altogether different having no relation with the facts and
circumstances before me and, therefore, it is also not of any
assistance.

14. Reliance has also been placed on the case of A. Joseph Fernando v.
Maria Navis reported in (1987) II DMC 342 (Madras, S.B.). It is held
that :

"The maintenance proceeding u/s. 125, Cr.P.C. was initiated earlier
though the order in the civil suit was passed earlier. In such
circumstances it is manifest that a petition u/s. 125 of Cr.P.C. is
perfectly maintainable notwithstanding a Civil Court's order for
maintenance. The criminal proceedings can not be quashed".

In the instant application, the applicant has not prayed for quashing
the criminal proceedings i.e. application presented u/s. 125 of Cr.P.C.
The only limited prayer is that the matter being seized with the Civil
Court, till the disposal of the Reg. C.S. No. 227/86, the proceedings
instituted u/s. 125 of Cr.P.C. be stayed. Therefore, the facts of the
case decided by the learned Court in the case supra and the facts
before me, being altogether different, this case is also not of any
assistance to the non-applicants.

15. In a case of Challapalli Sugars Ltd. v. Swadeshi Sugar Supply Pvt.
Ltd. (DB), in respect of the same subject matter,
there were two suits instituted though the relief was based on
different cause of action. The subject-matter in controversy in both
the suits being the same, arises out of the same contract and from the
same transaction, the later suit was stayed till the decision of the
earlier suit.

16. Considering the facts and circumstances and the submissions made by
the learned counsel for the parties, the relief in both the cases,
being one and the same, and the Civil Court being seized with the
matter, in the interest of justice, the proceeding pending in the court
of J.M.F.C. Buldana, be stayed till the decision of the Reg. C.S. No.
277/86.

17. The non-applicants could not be allowed to ride two horses at a
time (two simultaneous proceedings in two different Coruts) and could
not be permitted to continue the maintenance proceedings u/s. 125 of
Cr.P.C. when they had already chosen the alternative remedy in Reg.
C.S. No. 227/86. It is well settled law that the judgment of Civil
Court shall prevail over the judgment of Criminal Court. The natural
justice demands that parallel proceedings cannot be allowed to continue
in different Courts.

18. The Civil Judge, Sr. Dn. Buldana, is directed to expedite the
matter. Staying the proceedings pending in the Court of J.M.F.C.,
Buldana, will not cause any pre-judice to the non-applicants because
they are already receiving the maintenance allowance @ Rs. 250/- p.m.
for wife and Rs. 150/- p.m. for the daughter.

19. In these terms the application is allowed. Rule made absolute.

20. Ordered accordingly.

HC: Interim order passed under DV Act is revisable and any final order is Appealable

Punjab-Haryana High Court 1

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH

Crl. Misc. No.31518-M of 2008.
Date of Decision: 3.12.2008.
***
Balwinder Kaur & Anr.
.. Petitioners
Vs.

Mahan Singh & Ors.
.. Respondents.

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARVIND KUMAR,

Present:- Mr. Arun Takhi, Advocate
for the petitioner.
***

ARVIND KUMAR, J.

Through the instant- petition, the petitioner has sought
quashing of orders dated 3.10.2007 and 20.9.2008 passed by learned Sub
Divisional Magistrate Nawanshahr and learned Additional District and
Sessions Judge, Nawanshahr.
It emerges out from the paper book that the petitioners, who are
wife and son respectively of respondent No.1 Mahan Singh filed a
complaint with the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nawanshahr under the
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (for short, the Act)
against Mahan Singh and other in-laws. Along with the said complaint, they
also filed an application under Section 12 of the Act and sought interim
reliefs as provided under Sections 18 to 22 read with Section 23 of the Act.
After the contest, the application for interim reliefs was declined by the trial
court vide order dated 3.10.2007 and against that order, the petitioners
preferred a Crl. Misc. No. 51178-M of 2007 seeing quashing of the said
order, however, that petition was withdrawn with a liberty to avail
appropriate remedy under the law. Thereafter, the petitioners preferred a
revision before the Court of learned Sessions Judge, but the learned
Additional District and Sessions Judge, vide impugned order dated
20.9.2008 holding that the only relief available to the petitioners is to file an
appeal against the said order and that too within a period of thirty days and
hence doubting the maintainability of the revision, dismissed the same,
2

without touching the merits of the case
Learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the
learned revisional court has fallen into error of law by misinterpreting the
provisions of the Act and that Sections 12, 18 to 23 of the Act are governed
by the provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and as such the
revision was very much maintainable and Section 29 of the Act attracts only
when there is final order passed by the Magistrate and an appeal would lie
for the same..
There is force in the contention of learned counsel for the
petitioners. A conjoint reading of Section 12 of the Act and Rule 6(5) of
The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Rules, 2006 (for brevity,
the Rules) leaves no manner of doubt that the order passed on an application
for interim relief is very much revisable before the Court of Session and as a
consequence thereof, obviously, with the limitation as stipulated in the Code
of Criminal Procedure for the purpose.
At this stage, learned counsel has contended that if the order
passed by the revisional Court is set aside, he shall put up his case in respect
of legality and propriety of order dated 3.10.2007 passed by the Magistrate,
before that forum, on merits.
In view of this, the impugned order dated 20.9.2008 passed by
the Revisional Court is set aside and the matter is remitted back to it with a
direction to admit the revision of the petitioners and disposed it of
expeditiously, after hearing the parties on merit, that too without insisting
on the point of limitation.
The instant petition is disposed of without issuing any notice to
the opposite party, since in the considered opinion of this Court they have to
unnecessarily bear heavy expenses to contest this litigation. However,
liberty is given to the respondents to file an application for recalling of this
order, if they are dis-satisfied with the same.


(ARVIND KUMAR)
JUDGE
December 3,2008
Jiten

Documents ref:
The Protection Of Women From Domestic Violence Act, 2005
Section 12 in The Protection Of Women From Domestic Violence Act, 2005
Section 18 in The Protection Of Women From Domestic Violence Act, 2005
The Indian Penal Code, 1860
Section 29 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860

Tuesday, May 26, 2009

HC: Cognizance under DV Act taken for period before 26-10-06 is illegal

Smt.Gita vs Smt.Raj Bala & Others on 26 November, 2008


Punjab-Haryana High Court Criminal Misc.-M No.47145 of 2007 :1 :

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH


DATE OF DECISION: November 26, 2008



Smt.Gita

.....Petitioner

VERSUS



Smt.Raj Bala & others

....Respondents



CORAM:- HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE RANJIT SINGH

1. Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgement?
2. To be referred to the Reporters or not?
3. Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest?



PRESENT: Mr.Manoj Kaushik, Advocate,
for the petitioner.

Mr.Rohit Ahuja, Advocate,
for respondent No.1.

****

RANJIT SINGH, J.

Smt.Gita seeks quashing of notice/summoning order

dated 19.7.2006 passed by ACJM, Faridabad. She is a married

sister-in-law of the complainant and is separately residing at her

matrimonial home at Palwal, but is summoned to face prosecution

under the provisions of Protection of Women from Domestic Violence

Act, 2005. (for short "the Act").

The primary submission made on behalf of the petitioner
Criminal Misc.-M No.47145 of 2007 :2 :

is that she has wrongly and illegally been summoned for an offence

under the provisions of the Act, which was not even applicable on the

date the cognizance of the offence was taken. It is accordingly

pleaded that ACJM, Faridabad erred in taking cognizance of the

offence which was not an offence on the date he took cognizance of

the same.

The averment in the petition would show that the Act was

notified and came into effect w.e.f. 26.10.2006. The Magistrate,

however, has summoned the petitioner and his co-accused on

19.7.2006. The petitioner and her co-accused were summoned for

offences under Sections 12, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 of the Act. This is

stated to be an illegality as on 19.7.2006, the Act was not in force

and hence the so-called alleged offences under the Act, as noticed,

were not the offences on the Statute Book. Though other

submissions on merits have also been made, but need not be

noticed. The fact that this Act is enforced w.e.f. 26.10.2006 is not in

any serious dispute. Section 1(3) of the Act provides that the Act

shall come into force on such date as the Central Government may

by notification in the official Gazette appoint. The Central

Government has appointed 26 day of October, 2006 as the date on

which the said Act shall come into force as per Notification

No.S.O.1776(E) dated 17th October, 2006. It is, thus, clear that the

Act came into force w.e.f.26.10.2006. The learned counsel for

respondent No.1 did not dispute this factual position, but still insisted

in submitting that the Magistrate had rightly taken cognizance of

offence in this case as the Act is of the year 2005, i.e., prior to the

date, the Magistrate took cognizance on 19.7.2006. Without much
Criminal Misc.-M No.47145 of 2007 :3 :

justification, the counsel referred to a case of Pt.Rishikesh & Anr.

Vs. Smt.Salma Begum, 1995(3) RRR 429 in support of his plea. In

this case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that the

commencement of the Act is distinct from making the law. As per the

Hon'ble Supreme Court, as soon as the assent is given by the

President to the law passed by the Parliament it becomes law and

the commencement of the Act may be expressed in the Act itself,

namely, from the moment the assent was given by the President and

published in the Gazette, it becomes operative. However, it is also

observed that the operation may be postponed giving power to the

executive or delegated legislation to bring the Act into force at a

particular time unless otherwise provided. It is not understood as to

how this ratio of law would benefit the plea raised by the counsel for

the respondents. As already noticed, it is clearly provided in the Act

that it shall come into force on such date as the Central Government

may by notification in the official Gazette appoint. This Act came into

force on 26.10.2006, as already noticed. Thus, the legislature had

given power to the Central Government, delegated authority to notify

the date from which the Act was to come into force. This course is

permissible in terms of the law laid down in Pt.Rishikesh's case

(supra). There is no need, thus, to pursue further the argument

raised by the counsel for the respondent that the Act is of 2005 and,

so the Magistrate could take cognizance on 19.7.2006. This, if

permitted would violate the provisions of Article 20 of Constitution of

India. Article 20 grants protection in respect of conviction for

offences by providing that no person shall be convicted of any

offence except for violation of law in force at the time of the
Criminal Misc.-M No.47145 of 2007 :4 :

commission of the act charged as an offence. As per this Article,

when a certain act is not an offence according to law in force at the

time when the act is done, the person who does that act must not be

held guilty of an offence merely because subsequently a law is made

making such act an offence. When the petitioner is alleged to have

committed the offences under various sections of the Domestic

Violence Act, which is not in force on the date of such acts, then the

charge framed under the said sections would not be maintainable in

view of Art. 20(1) of the Constitution as the said penal provisions

were not in existence when the alleged offences were committed. In

fact, there was no law in force at the time when the petitioner

allegedly committed these acts and, therefore, would be entitled to

the protection of Art.20(1) of the Constitution. Once the Act came

into operation on 26.10.2006, the various provisions of the Act

creating offences would not be an offences for which the petitioner

can be put to trial. The action of the court in taking cognizance on the

basis of this complaint on 19.7.2006, as such, cannot be sustained.

The summoning order, thus, cannot be sustained and the same is

set-aside.

The petition is allowed.



November 26, 2008 ( RANJIT SINGH )
ramesh JUDGE

documents ref:
The Protection Of Women From Domestic Violence Act, 2005
Article 20 in The Constitution Of India 1949
Section 12 in The Protection Of Women From Domestic Violence Act, 2005
Section 23 in The Protection Of Women From Domestic Violence Act, 2005
Section 19 in The Protection Of Women From Domestic Violence Act, 2005

Wednesday, November 12, 2008

HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH: DV ACT 2005 is not retrospective

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH
AT HYDERABAD
THURSDAYITHESECONDDAYOFAUGUST
TWO THOUSAND AND SEVEN
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE K.C. BHANU
CRIMINAL PETITION NO : 3714 of 2007
Between:
1 U.U. Thimmanna, Slo U. U. Ayyanna
2 U.U. Sankaramma, W/o U. U. Thimmanna
3 U.U. Sreenivasulu, Slo U. U. Thimmanna
4 U.U. Paramesh, Slo U. U. Thimmanna
5 U.U.Ramesh, Slo U. U. Thimmanna
..... PETITIONERS
AND
1 Smt. U.U. Sandhya, Dlo U.M. Venkateswarlu
2 The State of Andhra Pradesh, rep. by its Public Prosecutor,
High Court of A.P., at Hyderabad.
I
..... RESPONDENTS
Petition under Section 482 of the Cr1.P.C praying that in the
circumstances stated in the quash proceedings filed therewith, the High
Court will be pleased to quash the proceedings in D.V.C.No. 1 of 2007
on the file of the Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Yemmiganur, Kurnool
District.
The Petition coming on for hearing, upon perusing the
Petition and the quash proceedings filed in support thereof and upon
hearing the arguments of Sri. C.PRAVEEN KUMAR, Advocate for the
Petitioner and of Smt. P. Rajeswari, Advocate for the Respondent No.1
and of the Public Prosecutor, on behalf of State.
The Court made the following:ORDER
THE HONt BLE SRI JUSTICE ' K . C . BEANU
CRIMINAL PETITION N0.3714 OF 2007.
O-RDER :
This Criminal Petition is filed by the
petitioners under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the
proceedings in DVC No.1 of 2007 on the file of the
Judicial Magistrate of I Class, Yemrniganur, Kurnool
District.
1
Heard both the counsel.
Admittedly, husband of the complainant died on
14-06-2004 and since then the de facto complainant is
not residing with the petitioners. The shared household
is defined under Section 2 (s) of the Protection
of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (for short
'the Act'), which reads as follows:
' 'shared household' means a household where the
person aggrieved lives or at any stage has lived
in a domestic relationship either singly or along
with the respondent and includes such a household
whether owned or tenanted either jointly by the
aggrieved person and the respondent or owned or
tenanted by either of them in respect of which
either the aggrieved peSrson or the respondent or
both jointly or singly have any right, title,
interest or equity and includes such a household
which may belong to the joint family of which the
respondent is a member, irrespective of whether
the respondent or the aggrieved person has any
right, title or interest in the shared
household. "
Domestic relationship is defined under Section 2
( E ) of the Act, which reads as follows:
" 'domestic relationship' means a relationship
between two persons who live or have, at any
point of time, lived together in a shared ,
household, when they are related by
consanguinity, marriage, or through a
relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption
or are family members living together a3 a joint
family."
On the face of the allegations in the complaint,
the de facto complainant is not residing with the
petitioners. She is ' residing in House No.2361, Near
M.G. Petrol, Yemmiganur, whereas petitioners 1 and 2
have been residing in House No. 3/31, Uppara street,
Yemmiganur, 3 r" petitioner .i. s rcaidi.nq n I;
Mahaboobnagar, 4th petitioner is residing at
H.No.S/2267,Laxmipeta, Yemmiganur and 5th petitioner is
rcsi di nq at: l l . N o . 3/31, tlppata Street, Yemmiqanur.
Admittedly, the de facto complainant filed a suit in
O.S. No.111 of 2005, which is pending, She also filed
a case in C.C.No.94 of 2005 under Section 498-A IPC,
which is pending trial before the Judl. Magistrate of
I Class, Yemmiganur. The domestic incident report does
not disclose any of the acts of violence that were
C A L Lc.r~lpLcd or1 t i cornplainant after 26-10-2006. There
is no dispute that the Act came into effect when the
Central Government appoints 26-10-2006 as the date on
which the Act was came into force. For acts of
violence, certain penal provisions are incorporated.
Therefore, it is a fundamental principle of law that
any penal provision has no retrospective operation,
o n l y t ) r ~ o : ; ~ ) c ' c I . i v c . 'I'llere is 110 ctlleyation either in the
report or in the statement or in the complaint of the
lSt respondent with regard to the acts of domestic
violence that took place on or after 26-10-2006.
Therefore, continuation of proceedings against the
petitioners is nothing but abuse of process of Court.
Accordingly, the Criminal Petition is allowed
quashing the proceedings in DVC No.1 of 2007 on the
file of the Judicial Magistrate of I Class,
Yemrniganur, Kurnool District.
SO/-N.MURALIDHAR RAO
ASSISTANT REGISTRAR
I/ TRUE COPY N
SECTION OFFICER
To
,l.Th e Judicial First Class Magistrate , Yemmiganur, Kurnool District
2. Two CC's to the Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra
Pradesh, Hyderabad (OUT)
3. Two CD copies
4. One CC to Sri. C. Praveen Kumar, Advocate (OPUC).
5. One CC to Smt. P. Rajeswari, Advocate (OPUC).
Prk w
HIGH COURT
DATED: 02-08-2007
ORDER
CRL.P. NO. 3714 OF 2007
Allowing the Petition.

Saturday, October 4, 2008

Daughter-In-Law has not right on her In-laws property

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI


Date of Reserve: September 05, 2008
Date of Order : September 30, 2008

CM(M) 105/2006
30.09.2008
Neetu Mittal ...Petitioner
Through: Ms. Radhika Chandrasekhar, Adv.


Versus


Kanta Mittal and Ors. ...Respondents
Through: Ms. Nandni Sahni, Adv. for R.1 and 2
Mr. Devendra Singh, Adv. for R.3


JUSTICE SHIV NARAYAN DHINGRA

1. Whether reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the
judgment? Yes.

2. To be referred to the reporter or not ? Yes.

3. Whether judgment should be reported in Digest ? Yes.


JUDGMENT:
1. The petitioner is aggrieved by an order dated 4th January, 2006
passed by the learned Additional Senior Judge allowing an appeal of the
respondent against order dated 24.5.2005 of Civil Judge dismissing an
application under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 CPC.
2. The respondents had filed a suit making petitioner, their son
and in-laws of the son as defendants wherein they prayed for permanent
injunction. An application under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 was made that the
petitioner and other respondents be restrained from forcibly and illegally
entering into their house No. B-2/23, Phase-II, Ashok Vihar and from interfering
with their peaceful living. The petitioner is wife of Sh. Vikas Mittal son of
respondents, Smt. Kanta Mittal and Sh. Ram Kishan Mittal.
3. The learned Senior Civil Judge while allowing appeal observed
that wife has a right to live in the matrimonial home after marriage but there
was no specific definition of matrimonial home. However, matrimonial home was
not just a building made of bricks and walls. It was a home/place comprising of
sweetness of relations of family members and elders, full of blessing. In the
matrimonial home, matrimonial rights and obligations are to be equally observed.
Practically speaking, the residence of husband should be the home of the wife
where both the spouses have equal right to reside.
4. The learned Senior Civil Jude found that in this case, the
respondents were parents of Sh. Vikas Mittal and in-laws of Neetu Mittal
(petitioner). They had separated from their son. The son had taken a flat in
Rohini for his own residence and residence of his wife. The son and his wife
had agreed to shift there on 10th May, 2005 under a compromise arrived at Police
Station. However, the wife did not stay in the flat at Rohini. Her grievance
was that flat was not habitable due to deficiency of fan, cooler, etc.


Thereafter, she asserted that she had a right to live in her in-laws' house in
Ashok Vihar and she wanted to forcibly live there which compelled respondents
no. 1 and 2 to file the suit. The learned Senior Civil Judge found that the
respondents were aged parents. They had shown by filing medical record that
they were suffering from various ailments and at this age of their life they
have a right to live peacefully at their home. Since the relations of
petitioner were not cordial with them, there was every likelihood of breach of
peace to the detriment to their mental and physical health. Due regards have to
be given to their rights. It was a admitted fact that the respondents and
petitioner could not live together under one roof with peace and harmony. The
common use of dining and one kitchen would create further problems and a
situation may come when parties may everyday land up at Police station or in the
Court, fighting on minor issues.
5. Learned Sr. Civil Judge also observed that the
respondents(parents) even apprehend danger to their lives and dignity, as per
the complaint made by them to the Police. Under these circumstances, the
learned Senior Civil Judge allowed the application under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2
CPC and restrained the defendants (petitioner herein) from forcibly entering
into their house and disturbing the peaceful possession of the respondents.
6. Counsel for the petitioner argued that the petitioner being wife
of son of respondents no. 1 and 2 has a right to live in the matrimonial home
and no injunction could legally have been issued by the learned Civil Judge.
She referred to Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 and argued
that the right of women to live in the shared household was to be protected by
every Court and the house of in-laws was a shared household and a matrimonial
home and she had a right to live there.
7. In S.R. Batra vs. Taruna Batra AIR 2007 SC 1118, Supreme Court
observed as under:
?16. There is no such law in India, like the British Matrimonial Homes Act, 1967
and in any case, the rights which may be available under any law can only be as
against the husband and not against the father-in-law or mother-in-law.

17. Here, the house in question belongs to the mother-in-law of Smt. Taruna
Batra and it does not belong to her husband Amit Batra. Hence, Smt. Taruna
Batra cannot claim any right to live in the said house.

xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx

27. Learned counsel for the respondent Smt. Taruna Batra has relied upon Section
19(1)(f) of the Act and claimed that she should be given an alternative
accommodation. In our opinion, the claim for alternative accommodation can only
be made against the husband and not against the husband's in-laws or other
relatives.

28. As regards Section 17(1) of the Act, in our opinion the wife is only
entitled to claim a right to residence in a shared household, and a 'shared
household' would only mean the house belonging to or taken on rent by the
husband, or the house which belongs to the joint family of which the husband is
a member. The property in question in the present case neither belongs to Amit
Batra nor was it taken on rent by him nor is it a joint family property of which
the husband Amit Batra is a member. It is the exclusive property of appellant
no.2, mother of Amit Batra. Hence it cannot be called a 'shared household'.?

8. As observed by the Supreme Court, 'Matrimonial home' is not
defined in any of the statutory provisions. However, phrase ?Matrimonial home?
refers to the place which is dwelling house used by the parties, i.e., husband
and wife or a place which was being used by husband and wife as the family


residence. Matrimonial home is not necessarily the house of the parents of the
husband. In fact the parents of the husband may allow him to live with them so
long as their relations with the son (husband) are cordial and full of love and
affection. But if the relations of the son or daughter-in-law with the parents
of husband turn sour and are not cordial, the parents can turn them out of
their house. The son can live in the house of parents as a matter of right only
if the house is an ancestral house in which the son has a share and he can
enforce the partition. Where the house is self-acquired house of the parents,
son, whether married or unmarried, has no legal right to live in that house and
he can live in that house only at the mercy of his parents upto the time the
parents allow. Merely because the parents have allowed him to live in the house
so long as his relations with the parents were cordial, does not mean that the
parents have to bear his burden throughout the life.
9. Once a person gains majority, he becomes independent and parents
have no liability to maintain him. It is different thing that out of love and
affection, the parents may continue to support him even when he becomes
financially independent or continue to help him even after his marriage. This
help and support of parents to the son is available only out of their love and
affection and out of mutual trust and understanding. There is no legal
liability on the parents to continue to support a dis-obedient son or a son
which becomes liability on them or a son who dis-respects or dis-regards them or
becomes a source of nuisance for them or trouble for them. The parents can
always forsake such a son and daughter-in-law and tell them to leave their house
and lead their own life and let them live in peace. It is because of love,
affection, mutual trust, respect and support that members of a joint family gain
from each other that the parents keep supporting their sons and families of
sons. In turn, the parents get equal support, love, affection and care. Where
this mutual relationship of love, care, trust and support goes, the parents
cannot be forced to keep a son or daughter in law with them nor there is any
statutory provision which compels parents to suffer because of the acts of
residence and his son or daughter in law. A woman has her rights of maintenance
against her husband or sons/daughters. She can assert her rights, if any,
against the property of her husband, but she cannot thrust herself against the
parents of her husband, nor can claim a right to live in the house of parents of
her husband, against their consult and wishes.
10. I therefore consider that the order passed by the learned
Senior Civil Jude granting injunction does not suffer from any illegality and
the petition is hereby dismissed.


September 30, 2008 SHIV NARAYAN DHINGRA J.

Thursday, July 31, 2008

DV case partly Quashed [Ajay Kant and Others Vs Smt. Alka Sharma]

HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH, JABALPUR BENCH AT GWALIOR*
(Miscellaneous Criminal Case No.1266/07)
*Ajay Kant and Others Vs Smt. Alka Sharma*
PRESENT
HON. SHRI JUSTICE B.M. GUPTA

Petitioners by Shri R.K. Sharma, Advocate.
Respondent by Shri Gaurav Samadiya, Advocate.

ORDER:19/06/07
The instant petition is for impugning the order dt.18th January,2007 passed
by Judicial Magistrate First Class, Gwalior in Criminal Case No.848/07,
whereby the learned Magistrate has issued notice to the petitioners on an
application filed by the respondent under section 12 of the Protection of
Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (hereinafter referred to as "the
Act").
2. Brief facts of the case are that respondent Smt.Alka Sharma has filed one
application under Section 12 of the Act against the petitioners. On which
the learned Magistrate, vide order dated 18th January, 2007, has issued
notices to the petitioners. It has been averred in the application that the
respondent has married with petitioner No.1 on 16th of May, 2005 at Gwalior.
For a period of 4-6 months she became pregnant and thereafter the
petitioners started harassing the respondent demanding Rs.2 lacs and one
Maruti car from her parents. As the father of the respondent is a pensioner,
he could not fulfill the demand. He reported the matter to Mahila Police
Station at Padav, Gwalior on 2nd November, 2005 but the report was not
lodged and no action was taken. On 3rd February, 2006 the respondent
delivered a male child in the hospital. Thereafter, on 17th February, 2006
the petitioners separated the child from the respondent, kept him along with
them and deserted the respondent. Consequently, since 20st February, 2006
she is living in her matrimonial home without her son. Petitioners are
trying to declare the respondent as mentally sick and to remarry the
petitioner No.1. Admittedly, one application for divorce has been filed by
the petitioner No.1 against the respondent and the respondent has filed an
application under Section 125 of Cr.P.C. claiming maintenance from him and
also she has filed another application under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage
Act for seeking a decree of restitution of conjugal rights against the
petitioner No.1. These applications are pending in the Family Court,
Gwalior. On these grounds, the respondent has prayed in the application for
taking legal action against the petitioners and also to punish them.
3. The aforementioned act of filing of the application by the respondent and
issuance of notice by the Court against the petitioners has been assailed by
the petitioners on various grounds. The grounds and decisions thereon are as
under :-
(A) That, the respondent was mentally sick before the marriage, which was
not disclosed by the respondent. On this ground, application for divorce has
been filed by petitioner No.1 on 15.5.06 in which proceedings for
reconciliation have been failed on 21.9.06. Only for creating pressure
against the petitioner No.1, the present application has been filed on false
grounds by the respondent on 23.11.06.
(B) That, in the application under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act filed
by the respondent these facts have not been mentioned by her that on demand
of Rs. 2 lacs and one Maruti car, she has been harassed by the petitioners
and as such the application being on false grounds, proceedings based on it
ought to quashed. The grounds in the application are false or not, this fact
cannot be decided by this Court during this
summery proceeding under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. The truthfulness or
otherwise of the facts mentioned in the application can be decided by the
learned Magistrate after due inquiry under the procedure as prescribed by
the Act. Hence, the proceeding based on the application cannot be quashed by
this Court at this stage on these two grounds.
(C) That, as provided by Section 2(q) of the Act, such application under
Section 12 of the Act cannot be filed against the petitioners No.3 and 4 who
are the ladies. In Section 2(q) of the Act the term respondent has been
defined as under :-
(q) respondent means any adult male person who is, or has been, in a
domestic relationship with the aggrieved person and against whom the
aggrieved person has sought any relief under this act : Provided that an
aggrieved wife or female living in a relationship in the nature of a
marriage may also file a complaint against a relative of the husband or the
male partner.
Thus, it is provided by this definition that an application can be filed by
an aggrieved person including the respondent claiming relief under the Act
only against the adult male person. However, as per the proviso appended to
this provision, a wife or female living in a relationship in the nature of a
marriage may also file a complaint against a relative of the husband or the
male partner. For understanding these two parts, i.e. the main part of the
Section and the proviso, it is necessary to understand the scheme of the
Act. The first three paragraphs of the statement of object and reasons under
which the bill No.116 of 2005 for passing the act was placed before the
parliament, are as under (published in the Gazette of India Extraordinary
Part II Section 2 page 22 dated 22nd August, 2005):-
"Domestic violence is undoubtedly a human rights issue and serious deterrent
to development. The Vienna Accord of 1994 and the Beijing Declaration and
the Platform for Action (1995) have acknowledged this. The United Nations
Committee on Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women (CEDAW) in its General Recommendation No.XII (1989) has
recommended that State parties should act to protect women against violence
of any kind especially that occurring within the family.
2.The phenomenon of domestic violence is widely prevalent but has remained
largely invisible in the public domain. Presently, where a woman is
subjected to cruelty by her husband or his relatives, it is an offence under
section 498A of the Indian Penal Code. The civil law does not however
address this phenomenon in its entirety.
3. It is, therefore, proposed to enact a law keeping in view the rights
guaranteed under articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution to provide for a
remedy under the civil law which is intended to protect the woman from being
victims of domestic violence and to prevent the occurrence of domestic
violence in the society.(Emphasis supplied)
Keeping these objects and reasons in mind to provide for more effective
protection of the rights of women guaranteed under the Constitution who are
victims of violence of any kind occurring within the family and for matters
connected therewith or incidental thereto, the bill was presented before the
parliament which has become the Act after passing the same by the
parliament. Thus, it cannot be lost sight of that the Act has been passed
keeping in view the rights guaranteed under articles 14, 15 and 21 of the
Constitution to provide for a remedy under the civil law which is intended
to protect the woman from being victims of domestic violence and to prevent
the occurrence of domestic violence in the society. Thus, basically the act
has been passed to provide the civil remedy against domestic violence to the
women. However, as provided by Sections 27 and 28 of the Act, a Judicial
Magistrate of the
first class or the Metropolitan Magistrate has been empowered to grant a
protection order and other orders and to try the offence under the Act. Vide
Section 28 of the Act, it is mentioned that save as otherwise provided in
this Act, all proceedings under Sections 12, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 and
the offences under Section 31 shall be governed by the provisions of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Vide sub-sections 3 and 4 of Section 19,
it is also provided that a Magistrate may require from the respondent to
execute a bond, with or without sureties, for preventing the commission of
domestic violence and such order shall be deemed to be an order under
Chapter VIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and shall be dealt with
accordingly. Chapter VIII of Cr.P.C. dealt with security for keeping peace
and for good behavior which runs from Section 106 to 124. In these Sections,
it is provided that for keeping the peace and maintaining good behavior, a
person can be directed by a Magistrate to execute a bond with or without
sureties and in case of non-compliance of such order, that person can be
detained into custody. Section 31 of the Act provides penalty for breach of
protection order passed by the Magistrate, which is punishable as an
offence. A protection order can only be passed under Section 18 of the Act.
To understand better the provisions of Sections 18 and 31 are required to be
perused, which are as under: -
Section18.The Magistrate may, after giving the aggrieved person and the
respondent an opportunity of being heard and on being prima facie satisfied
that domestic violence has taken place or is likely to take place, pass a
protection order in favour of the aggrieved person and prohibit the
respondent from-
(a) committing any act of domestic violence;
(b) aiding or abetting in the commission of acts of domestic violence;
(c) entering the place of employment of the aggrieved person or, if the
person aggrieved is a child, its school or any other place frequented by the
aggrieved person;
(d) attempting to communicate in any form, whatsoever, with the aggrieved
person, including personal, oral or written or electronic or telephonic
contact;
(e) alienating any assets, operating bank lockers or bank accounts used or
held or enjoyed by both the parties, jointly by the aggrieved person and the
respondent or singly by the respondent, including her Stridhan or any other
property held either jointly by the parties or separately by them without
the leave of the Magistrate;
(f) causing violence to the dependants, other relatives or any person who
give the aggrieved person assistance from domestic violence;
(g) committing any other act as specified in the protection order.
Section 31. (1) A breach of protection order, or of an interim protection
order, by the respondent shall be an offence under this Act and shall be
punishable with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to twenty thousand rupees,
or with both.
(2) The offence under sub-section (1) shall as far as practicable be tried
by the Magistrate who had passed the order, the breach of which has been
alleged to have been caused by the accused.
(3) While framing charges under sub-section (1), the Magistrate may also
frame charges under section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code or any other
provision of that Code or the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, as the case may
be, if the facts disclose the commission of an offence under those
provisions.
The offence under Section 31 of the Act will be cognizable and non-bailable
as provided under Section 32 of the Act.
Section 8 of the Act provides for appointment of the Protection Officer and
Section 33 of the Act provides for penalty for not discharging duty by the
Protection Officer. Despite, as mentioned in the objects and reasons that
for providing a civil remedy, this act has been enacted, the provisions of
Sections 19, 27, 28, 31 to 33 clearly mention that some of the proceedings
under the Act are of criminal nature. Under Section 19 to 22 of the Act an
order to provide residential facilities, monetary reliefs, custody order for
a child and compensation can be ordered by the Magistrate under the Act.
Except a part of Section 19 with regard to direction of execution of a bond
and dealing the same as provided under Chapter VIII of the Cr.P.C., all the
reliefs under Sections 18 to 22 appear to be of civil nature. Thus, some of
the proceedings under this Act can be said to be of civil nature and some of
the proceedings can be said to be of criminal nature.
Section 12 of the Act provides that an application (not a complaint) for
seeking one or more reliefs under the Act can be filed. On perusal of
Sections 18 to 22 of the act, it appears that the reliefs under these
sections as mentioned herein above can be passed on the application under
Section 12 of the Act. The word complaint as appeared in the definition of
respondent under Section 2(q) of the Act has not been defined anywhere in
the Act. Although it is not provided that the definition of complaint can be
considered the same as provided under the Cr.P.C. but at the same time it is
also not prohibited. In view of this, the definition of complaint can
appropriately be seen in Cr.P.C. which goes as under :-
2(d) "complaint" means any allegation made orally or in writing to a
Magistrate, with a view to his taking action under this Code, that some
person, whether known or unknown, has committed an offence, but does not
include a police report.
It is clear by this definition that a complaint as provided in Cr.P.C. can
only be for an offence. As mentioned hereinabove only two offences have been
mentioned in this Act and those are (1) under Section 31 and (2) under
Section 33. It appears that this word complaint appeared in the definition
of respondent has been used for initiating proceedings for these two
offences and an aggrieved wife or female living in a relationship in the
nature of a marriage has been given a right to file a complaint against a
relative of the husband or the male partner. This word complaint cannot be
considered beyond the scope of the main provision of this Section which has
been defined in first part of Section 2(q) that is for any relief under this
Act. As provided in Section 31 of the Act, a complaint can be filed against
a person who has not complied with a protection order or interim protection
order.
Thus, it is clear by the definition of respondent that for obtaining any
relief under this Act an application can be filed or a proceeding can be
initiated against only adult male person and on such application or under
such proceeding, aforementioned protection order can be passed. Obviously
those orders will also be passed only against the adult male person. As
provided under Section 31 of the Act, non-compliance of a protection order
or an interim protection order has been made punishable and as such it can
be said that the complaint for this offence can only be filed against such
adult male person/respondent who has not complied with the protection order.
Hence, it is clear that the application under Section 12 of the Act which
has been filed by the respondent against petitioners No.3 and 4, who are not
adult male persons, is not maintainable.
(D)The proceeding has also been assailed on the ground that before issuance
of the notice, learned Magistrate has recorded the statement of the
respondent which is not required. It is true that recording of statements as
provided under Sections 200 and 202 of Cr.P.C. is not required before
issuance of the notice because application under Section 12 of the Act is an
application and not a complaint. However, this action of the learned
Magistrate cannot be a ground for quashing the proceedings because as
provided by sub-section 2 of Section 28 of the Act, the Court/learned
Magistrate is not prevented from laying down its own procedure for disposal
of an application under Section 12 of the Act.
(E) The proceeding has also been assailed on the ground that no report from
the Protection Officer under Section 12 of the Act has been called.
Sub-section 1 of Section 12 of the Act goes as under:-
12.(1) An aggrieved person or a Protection Officer or any other person on
behalf of the aggrieved person may present an application to the Magistrate
seeking one or more reliefs under this Act: Provided that before passing any
order on such application, the Magistrate shall take into consideration any
domestic incident report received by him from the Protection Officer or the
service provider; On perusal of the aforementioned proviso appended to the
provision, it appears that before passing any order on the application, it
is obligatory on a Magistrate to take into consideration any report received
by him from the Protection Officer or the service provider. Neither it is
obligatory for a Magistrate to call such report nor it is necessary that
before issuance of notice to the petitioners it was obligatory for a
Magistrate to consider the report. The words before passing any order
provide that any final order on the application and not merely issuance of
notice to the respondent/the petitioners herein. The words any report also
mention that a report, if any, received by a Magistrate shall be considered.
Thus, at this stage if the report has not been called or has not been
considered, it cannot be a ground for quashing the proceeding.
(F) The last ground raised by the petitioners is that in the application the
relief of penalizing the petitioners has been prayed for, which is beyond
the provisions of the Act. On perusal of the last paragraph of the
application, it is prayed that after registration of the case, petitioners
be legally penalized. It is true that at this stage in the application it
was not required for the respondent to claim such relief, however, if it has
been claimed, this cannot be a ground on which the proceedings can be
quashed. At the most, such reliefs if unnecessary, can be negated.
4. Although it is not argued yet it appears appropriate to mention that any
order passed by the learned Magistrate under the Act is appealable as
provided by Section 29 of the Act. Usually when an opportunity to assail the
impugned order in revision or appeal is available, taking recourse under
Section 482 of Cr.P.C. is not required. However, it is observed by the Apex
Court in para 26 in the case of Pepsi Foods Ltd. and another Vs. Special
Judicial Magistrate and others, (1998) 5 Supreme Court Cases 749 that some
time for immediate relief Section 482 of the Code or Article 227 may have to
be resorted to, for correcting some grave errors that might be committed by
the subordinate courts. Considering the steps taken by the learned
Magistrate against the petitioners No.3 and 4, this petition has been
considered herein.
5. In view of all, as discussed hereinabove, the petition deserves to be
partly allowed. Consequently, it is partly allowed. The proceeding against
petitioners No.3 and 4 is quashed. It is directed that the learned
Magistrate will deal the application as provided under the various
provisions of the Act and as observed hereinabove.