Saturday, September 12, 2009

Munish Bhasin & Ors Vs N.C.T. of Delhi [ Irrelevant bail conditions can not be imposed]

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 344 OF 2009 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Criminal) No.
637 of 2008) Munish Bhasin & Ors. ... Appellants Versus

State (Govt. of N.C.T. of Delhi) & Anr. ... Respondents JUDGMENT

J.M. PANCHAL, J.

Leave granted. The complainant (wife of first appellant) to whom notice was
ordered on 25.01.2008 is impleaded as second respondent.



2. Heard Counsel.

2

3. The appellant (accused no. 1) assails the condition imposed by the High
Court requiring him to pay a sum of Rs.12,500/- as maintenance to his wife and
child while granting anticipatory bail to him and his parents with reference
to the complaint filed by his wife for alleged commission of offences
punishable under Sections 498A and 406 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal
Code.

4. The marriage of the appellant was solemnized with Ms. Renuka on December 05,
2004. She has filed a complaint in November 2006, against the appellant and
his parents for alleged commission of offences punishable under Sections 498A
and 406 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code on the grounds that after
marriage she was subjected to mental and physical cruelty for bringing less
dowry and that her stri-dhan entrusted to them has been dishonestly
misappropriated by them.

3

5. Apprehending arrest, the appellant and his parents moved High Court of Delhi
for anticipatory bail. The application came up for consideration before a
Learned Single Judge of the High Court on 22.02.2007. The Learned Additional
Public Prosecutor accepted notice and submitted that the matter was essentially
a matrimonial dispute and therefore the parties should be referred to the
Mediation and Conciliation Cell of the Delhi High Court. The Learned Judge
agreed with the suggestion made by the Additional Public Prosecutor and
directed the parties to appear before the Mediation and Conciliation Cell of
the Delhi High Court on March 02, 2007. The case was ordered to be listed on
10.05.2007. The Learned Judge further directed that in the event of arrest of
the appellant and his parents, before the next date of hearing, they shall be
released on bail on their furnishing personal bond in the sum of Rs.25,000/-
each with one surety of like amount to the satisfaction of the Investigating
Officer/ Arresting Officer concerned, subject however, to the condition that
the appellant and 4

his parents shall surrender their passports to the Investigating Officer and
shall file affidavits in the Court that they would not leave the country
without prior permission of the Court.



6. From the records, it appears that the conciliation proceedings failed and
therefore the bail application was taken up for hearing on merits. On
representation made by the wife of the appellant, the counsel of the appellant
was directed to produce appellant's salary slip. Accordingly, the salary slip
of the appellant was produced before the Court which indicated that the
appellant was drawing gross salary of Rs.41,598/- and after deductions of
advance tax etc., his net salary was Rs.33,000/-. The Learned Single Judge of
the High Court took the notice of the fact that the appellant had the duty to
maintain his wife and the child and therefore as a condition for grant of
anticipatory bail, directed the appellant, by the order dated 07.08.2007 to pay
a sum of Rs.12,500/- per month by way of maintenance to his 5

wife and child. The Learned Single Judge also directed to pay arrears at the
rate of Rs. 12,500/- per month from August 2005, that is Rs. 3,00,000/- within
six months. The imposition of these conditions for grant of anticipatory bail
is the subject matter of challenge in the instant appeal.



7. From the perusal of the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 438, it is
evident that when the High Court or the Court of Session makes a direction
under sub- section (1) to release an accused alleged to have committed non-
bailable offence, the Court may include such conditions in such direction in
the light of the facts of the particular case, as it may think fit, including
(i) a condition that a person shall make himself available for interrogation
by police officer as and when required, (ii) a condition that the person shall
not, directly or indirectly, make any inducement, threat or promise to any
person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him from
disclosing such facts to the Court or to any 6

police officer, (iii) a condition that the person shall not leave India without
the previous permission of the Court and (iv) such other conditions as may be
imposed under sub-section (3) of section 437, as if the bail were granted
under that section. Sub-section (3) of Section 437, inter alia, provides that
when a person accused or suspected of the commission of an offence punishable
with imprisonment which may extend to seven years or more or of an offence
under Chapter VI, Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code or
abetment of, or conspiracy or attempt to commit, any such offence, is released
on bail under sub-section (1), the Court shall impose the following conditions-

(a) that such person shall attend in accordance with the conditions of the
bond executed under this Chapter,

(b) that such person shall not commit an offence similar to the offence of
which he is accused, or suspected, of the commission of which he is suspected,
and

7

(c) that such person shall not directly or indirectly make any
inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the
case so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the Court or to any
police officer or tamper with the evidence.

The Court may also impose, in the interests of justice, such other
conditions as it considers necessary.

8. It is well settled that while exercising discretion to release an accused
under Section 438 of the Code neither the High Court nor the Session Court
would be justified in imposing freakish conditions. There is no manner of
doubt that the Court having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case
can impose necessary, just and efficacious conditions while enlarging an
accused on bail under Section 438 of the Code. However, the accused cannot be
subjected to any irrelevant condition at all. The conditions which can be
imposed by the Court while granting anticipatory bail are 8

enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 438 and sub- section (3) of Section
437 of the Code. Normally, conditions can be imposed (i) to secure the presence
of the accused before the investigating officer or before the Court, (ii) to
prevent him from fleeing the course of justice, (iii) to prevent him from
tampering with the evidence or to prevent him from inducing or intimidating
the witnesses so as to dissuade them from disclosing the facts before the
police or Court or (iv) restricting the movements of the accused in a
particular area or locality or to maintain law and order etc. To subject an
accused to any other condition would be beyond jurisdiction of the power
conferred on Court under section 438 of the Code. While imposing conditions on
an accused who approaches the Court under section 438 of the Code, the Court
should be extremely chary in imposing conditions and should not transgress its
jurisdiction or power by imposing the conditions which are not called for at
all. There is no manner of doubt that the conditions to be imposed under
section 438 of the Code cannot be harsh, 9

onerous or excessive so as to frustrate the very object of grant of
anticipatory bail under section 438 of the Code. In the instant case, the
question before the Court was whether having regard to the averments made by
Ms. Renuka in her complaint, the appellant and his parents were entitled to
bail under section 438 of the Code. When the High Court had found that a case
for grant of bail under section 438 was made out, it was not open to the Court
to direct the appellant to pay Rs. 3,00,000/- for past maintenance and a sum of
Rs.12,500/- per month as future maintenance to his wife and child. In a
proceeding under section 438 of the Code, the Court would not be justified in
awarding maintenance to the wife and child. The case of the appellant is that
his wife Renuka is employed and receiving a handsome salary and therefore is
not entitled to maintenance. Normally, the question of grant of maintenance
should be left to be decided by the competent Court in an appropriate
proceedings where the parties can adduce evidence in support of their
respective case, after which liability of 10

husband to pay maintenance could be determined and appropriate order would be
passed directing the husband to pay amount of maintenance to his wife. The
record of the instant case indicates that the wife of the appellant has
already approached appropriate Court for grant of maintenance and therefore the
High Court should have refrained from granting maintenance to the wife and
child of the appellant while exercising powers under section 438 of the Code.
The condition imposed by the High court directing the appellant to pay a sum of
Rs.12,500/- per month as maintenance to his wife and child is onerous,
unwarranted and is liable to be set aside.



9. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal succeeds. The direction contained in
order dated August 07, 2007 rendered by Learned Single Judge of Delhi High
Court in Bail Application No. 423 of 2007 requiring the appellant to pay a sum
of Rs.12,500/- per month by way of maintenance (both past and future) to his
wife and child 11

is hereby deleted. Rest of the directions contained in the said order are
maintained. It is however clarified that any amount received by the wife of the
appellant pursuant to the order of the High Court need not be refunded by her
to the appellant and will be adjusted subject to the result of application for
maintenance filed by wife of the appellant under Section 125 of the Code
before the appropriate Court.



10. The Appeal is accordingly disposed of. ..............................J.

[R.V. Raveendran]

..............................J.

[J.M. Panchal]

New Delhi;

February 20, 2009.

12

Wednesday, September 9, 2009

Rakesh Kumar And Others vs State Of Punjab And Another

Criminal Misc. No.M-18404 of 2008 1 In the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at
Chandigarh Criminal Misc. No.M-18404 of 2008

Date of decision: 22.1.2009

Rakesh Kumar and others

......Petitioners

Versus

State of Punjab and another

.......Respondents

CORAM: HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE SABINA

Present: Mr.P.S.Hundal, Sr.Advocate with Mr.N.S.Sondhi, Advocate,

for the petitioners.

Mr.Aman Deep Singh Rai, AAG, Punjab.

Mr.Vishal Aggarwal, Advocate,

for respondent No.2.

****

SABINA, J.

The petitioners have filed this petition under Section 482 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure ("Cr.P.C." for short) seeking quashing of order on
framing of charge dated 30.4.2007 (Annexure P-7), charge sheet dated 30.4.2007
(Annexure P-8) passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, Ist Class, Ludhiana
order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Ludhiana
dated 4.6.2008 (Annexure P-9) dismissing the revision petition against framing
of charge and all subsequent proceedings. Petitioner Nos. 1 and 4 are brothers
of the husband of the complainant, whereas, respondent No.3 is the un-married
sister of Criminal Misc. No.M-18404 of 2008 2 the husband of the complainant.
Petitioner Nos. 2 and 5 are the wives of petitioner Nos. 1 and 4 respectively.
The case of the complainant, as set out in the First Information Report, is
reproduced as under:- "Application for registration of a case under Section
406, 498-A, 120-B and Protection of Woman from Domestic Violence Act, 2005
against 1. Mukesh Kumar s/o Sh.Ved Parkash Marwaha 2. Asha Rani wife of late
Sh.Ved Parkash Marwaha, 3. Rajesh Kumar Marwaha son of late Sh.Ved Parkash
Marwaha, 4. Simran wife of Rajesh Kumar Marwaha, 5. Rakesh Kumar son of late
Sh. Ved Parkash Marwaha, 6. Meenu wife of Sh.Rakesh Kumar, 7., Poonam daughter
of late Sh.Ved Parkash Marwaha all residents of 191, Kidwai Nagar, Near Shiv
Shakti Mandir, Ludhiana, 8. Neena wife of Sh.Anil Kumar resident of Denmark.
Sir, 1. That the marriage of the applicant was solemnized on 11.2.2004 with the
accused No.1 according to Hindu rites and ceremonies. This marriage was
solemnized by the mother of the applicant with the help of sister of the
applicant and spent about Rs.5,00,000/- on the marriage of the applicant. The
mother of the applicant gave items No. 1 to 6 to my husband namely Mukesh
Kumar, items No.7 to 9 to my mother-in-law namely Asha Rani, items No. 10 to 18
to Criminal Misc. No.M-18404 of 2008 3 my brother-in-law namely Rajesh Kumar,
items No.19 to 23 to Simran my sister-in-law (Jethani), items No.24 to 26 to
my sister-in-law namely Meenu (Jethani) and items No.27 to 34 to Rakesh Kumar
my brother-in-law (my husband's brother) and items No. 35 to 40 to my elder
sister-in-law namely Poonam as per Anexure 'A' and the cash receipts and Bills
of the items were handed over to the family members of the accused No.1 and
these items were given to the accused in presence of Kirpal Singh son of Amar
Singh cousin of the applicant and Rajinder Singh son of Sh.Balwant Singh cousin
of the applicant and these items were given to the above said accused with the
assurance that these items will be handed over to the applicant after reaching
the applicant to her in-laws house. But all the accused dishonestly
misappropriated all the items given to the applicant and converted the same
for their own use.

2. That all the accused were not satisfied with the dowry articles
given to accused at the time of the marriage. They started taunting,
humiliating the applicant on one excuse or the other. The accused No.1 and his
family members started demanding Santro Car from the mother of the applicant.
The applicant showed her inability to fulfil the demand of Santro Car because
her Criminal Misc. No.M-18404 of 2008 4 mother had already spent a huge amount
on the marriage of the applicant. Thereafter, all the accused started
harassing the complainant only to fulfil their demand of Santro Car. In the
meantime the complainant became pregnant during the month of June, 2004. But
the applicant did not disclose her mother and sister about the maltreatment by
the accused with the hope that after the birth of child, the accused may
change their attitude towards the complainant. But the complainant was
suffering from Ruptured Ectopil Pregnancy and was operated on 19.7.2004.
Thereafter, all the accused became so arrogant towards the complainant. They
started harassing the complainant. The information regarding the operation was
also sent given to accused No.8 Neena on telephone by the husband of the
complainant. She also used abusive language against the complainant and told my
husband to take divorce from me and instigated my husband to remarriage. The
accused separated the complainant from the in-laws house with the excuse that
there is no sufficient space in the in-laws house and the dowry articles give
by the mother of the complainant were retained in the in-laws house and we
were given some furniture, utensils etc. Criminal Misc. No.M-18404 of 2008 5
thereafter, in the month of December, 2005 the complainant again became
pregnant and was again suffering from Ruptured Ectopil Pregnancy and was
operated on 16.12.2005. After the operation of the complainant the behaviour of
all the accused was totally changed towards the complainant. They started
using derogatory language against the complainant by calling the complainant
"Baanj" by the accused 1,2,3 and 4. Even the respondent No.8 also used these
words against the complainant on telephone from Denmark and instigated my
husband to divorce me and said that she will arrange his second marriage at
Denmark. In this way all the accused mentally tortured the complainant on
account of non bringing of Santro car and by calling her 'Baanj". On 18.6.2006,
when the complainant was at her house the respondents No.1 to 7 namely Mukesh
Kumar, Asha Rani wife of late Sh.Ved Parkash Marwaha, Rajesh Kumar Marwaha,
Simran, Rakesh Kumar, Meenu, Poonam came there and accused No.1, 3 and 5 along
with other accused started beating the complainant under the influence of
liquor. The accused No.2 mother of my husband instigated all the accused to
beat the complainant. Ultimately the complainant was turned out of the house
Criminal Misc. No.M-18404 of 2008 6 in three clothes on 22.6.2006. The items
given by the mother of the applicant on different occasions as mentioned in
Annexure "A" and "B" have also been retained by the accused. Similarly the
items given by the in-laws of the applicant as shown in the Annexure "C" have
not been handed over to the applicant. It is pertinent to mention here that the
accused No.1 moved an application before the S.P.City (1), Ludhiana on a
flimsy ground only to save himself and his family members from the clutches of
law. Thereafter, the complainant and other family members requested the
accused to rehabilitate the complainant, but he refused to rehabilitate the
complainant.

3. That before the Panchayat consisting of Rajinder Singh s/o
Sh.Balwant Singh, Kirpal Singh son of Sh.Amar Singh, Raju c/o Sewak Tent House
and other respectables of the locality the accused and his family members
repeated the same demand of Santro Car and when the accused refused to
rehabilitate the complainant the Panchayat members and the complainant
demanded her ISTRI DHAN from all the accused, but they refused to return the
same to the complainant. So all the accused have committed breach of trust by
refusing to return the ISTRI DHAN. It Criminal Misc. No.M-18404 of 2008 7 is ,
therefore, prayed that a case under Section 406, 498-A, 120-B IPC and
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 may kindly be registered
and items given in Annexures "A" and "B" be recovered from the accused and
accused be punished accordinglyl."

Learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that there were
no specific allegations against the petitioners in the FIR. The petitioners had
merely been roped in this case being relatives of the husband of the
complainant.

Learned counsel for the complainant, on the other hand, has
submitted that all the accused including the petitioners had been harassing the
complainant and had misappropriated the dowry articles. He has further
submitted that the order, vide which the charge was framed, had been challenged
by the petitioners before the Additional Sessions Judge, Ludhiana by way of a
revision petition and hence, second revision petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
was not maintainable. In this regard, he has placed reliance on Darshan Singh
vs. State of Punjab, 1996 (1) RCR (Criminal) 464, Rajinder Prasad vs. Bashir,
2001(4) RCR (Criminal) 312 and Deepti vs. Akhil Raj, 1995 (3) RCR (Criminal)
638.

It has been held by the Apex Court in Krishanan vs. Krishnaveni,
AIR 1997 SC 987, in para 9 of its judgment, as under:- "The inherent power of
the High Court is not one Criminal Misc. No.M-18404 of 2008 8 conferred by the
Code but one which the High Court already has in it and which is preserved by
the Code. The object of Section 397(3) is to put a bar on simultaneous
revisional applications to the High Court and the Court of Sessions so as to
prevent unnecessary delay and multiplicity of proceedings . As seen, under sub
section (3) of Section 397, revisional jurisdiction can be invoked by "any
person" but the Code has not defined the word 'person'. However, under Section
11 of the IPC, 'person' includes any Company or Association or body of
persons, whether incorporated or not. The word 'person' would, therefore
include not only the natural person but also juridical person in whatever from
designated and whether incorporated or not. By implication, the State stands
excluded from the purview of the word 'person' for the purpose of limiting its
right to avail the revisional power of the High Court under Section 397 (1) of
the Code for the reason that the State, being the prosecutor of the offender
is enjoined to conduct prosecution on behalf of the society and to take such
remedial steps as it deems proper. The object behind criminal law is to
maintain law, public order, stability as also peace and progress in the
society. Generally, private complaints under Section 202 of the Code are laid
in respect of non- Criminal Misc. No.M-18404 of 2008 9 cognizable offences or
when it is found that police has failed to perform its duty under Chapter XII
of the Code or to report as mistake of fact. In view of the principle laid
down in the maxim Ex debito justitiae, i.e. in accordance with the requirements
of justice, the prohibition under Section 397 (3) on revisional power given to
the High Court would not apply when the State seeks revision under Section
401. So the State is not prohibited to avail the revisional power of the High
Court under Section 397 (1) read with Section 401 of the Code."

The said view has been followed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
later decisions also.

So far as the decision in Darshan Singh's case (supra), relied
upon by the learned counsel for the complainant, is concerned, there it was
held that the second revision petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. was not
maintainable as disputed questions of fact were involved in the case. In
Deepti's case (Supra), Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the High Court Could not
interfere simply on the basis of the statement of the State Govt as there was
sufficient material on record to frame charge against the accused under Section
498-A IPC. In Rajinder Prasad's case (supra), the order, whereby the
cognizance taken by the Magistrate was set aside by the High Court, was
challenged in the Apex Court and it was held that since the revision petition
filed under Section 397 Cr.P.C. had been rejected by Criminal Misc. No.M-18404
of 2008 10 the High Court then the aggrieved party had no right to file a
petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. with a prayer for quashing the same order.

In Rishi Anand vs. Govt. of NCT of Delhi, AIR 2002 SC 1531, the
Apex Court quashed the FIR under Section 482 Cr.P.C. because there were no
allegations of specific nature to connect the accused with the alleged offence
under Section 406 IPC. There was nothing in the FIR to show that the articles
were entrusted to the accused at the time of marriage. The accused had gone to
USA after his brief stay in India. In Prasanta Kumar vs. The State of West
Bengal, AIR 2003 SC 4412, the High Court had declined to entertain a petition
under Section 482/401 Cr.P.C. on the ground that the second revision petition
was not maintainable. The judgment of the High Court was set aside that
petition could not be dismissed on this technical ground and the High Court
should have gone out into the merit of the case to find out if it was a fit
case to interfere in revision. Reliance was placed on the decision in
Krishanan's case (Supra).

In Lakhwinder Singh vs. State of Punjab, 2004(4) RCR (Criminal)
104, it was held in para Nos. 12 and 19 as under:- "12. The observations made
above leave no manner of doubt that the wholesome jurisdiction conferred upon
the High Court by Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be
narrowed, confined or put in a strait-jacket. Criminal Misc. No.M-18404 of 2008
11 This inherent power can always be exercised by the High Court to prevent
abuse of the process of Court or to otherwise to secure the ends of justice.
The only constraint on the High Court is that since the power under this
section is very wide, it should be exercised with great care and and caution.
On the other hand, the court should not shy away from exercising this power
when the accused persons are being persecuted in the guise of prosecution.
Proceedings initiated and continued for oblique motives or to wreak vengeance
on the other party are liable to be quashed. Proceedings are also liable to be
quashed if even on the allegation being accepted in toto, prima facie no
offence could be made out.

19. It, thus, become fairly evident that the court have
consistently put an end to criminal proceedings which are an abuse of the
process of Court. At the initial stage, at the summoning stage and even after
charges have been framed, the High Court has the inherent power to quash
proceedings and to pass such orders as are necessary to prevent abuse of the
process of any court or otherwise to secure ends of justice. Section 482 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure contains a non-obstante clause to the effect that
nothing in the Code of Criminal Procedure shall be deemed to limit the powers
of the High Court to Criminal Misc. No.M-18404 of 2008 12 prevent abuse of the
process of Court. Therefore, filing of the charge-sheet in Court does not in
any manner affect the amplitude of the wholesome jurisdiction of the High
Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The only rider
being, that greater the power, greater the care and caution in exercise
thereof" This Court in para 6 of its judgment in Manoj vs. Prem Lal, 2006(3)
RCR(Criminal) 941, held as under:- "Power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has to be
exercised sparingly and such power was not to be utilised as a substitute for
second revision. Ordinarily, when a revision has been barred under Section 397
(3) of the Code, the complainant or the accused cannot be allowed to take
recourse to revision before the High Court under Section 397 (1) of the Code,
as it is prohibited under Section 397 (3) Cr.P.C. However, the High Court can
entertain a petition under Section 482 of the Code, when there is serious
miscarriage of justice and abuse of the process of the Court or when mandatory
provision of law are not complied with and when the High Court feels that the
inherent jurisdiction is to be exercised to correct the mistake committed by
the revisional Court." Thus, the legal position that emerges is that this Court
is not expected to throw out a case on technicalities but is expected to
Criminal Misc. No.M-18404 of 2008 13 interfere wherever there has been failure
of justice or misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure. This Court is not
expected to be a mere silent spectator when it is made out that that criminal
prosecution is an abuse of process of the Court. This Court, in its discretion,
is expected to prevent the abuse of process or miscarriage of justice by
exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

In the present case the petitioners are the brothers, their wives
and sister of the husband of the complainant. A perusal of the FIR (Annexure
P-1) reveals that all the allegations are general in nature. So far as the
entrustment of dowry articles is concerned, the memos of recovery of dowry
articles (Annexure P-3 to P-6) reveal that dowry articles were recovered from
the husband and mother-in- law of the complainant. It has been averred that the
complainant had been tortured by all the accused for not bringing a Santro car
and by calling her baanj. It has also been averred in the FIR that petitioner
Nos.1 and 4 along with Mukesh Kumar, husband of the complainant, had given
beatings to the complainant under the influence of liquor. However, no specific
date has been mentioned nor the nature of injuries suffered by the complainant
has been disclosed in this regard.

In Kans Raj vs. State of Punjab and others, 2000 (2) RCR
(Criminal) 696 (SC), their Lordships of the Apex Court have observed that a
tendency has developed for roping in all the Criminal Misc. No.M-18404 of 2008
14 relations in dowry cases and if it is not discouraged,
it is likely to
affect case of the prosecution even against the real culprits. The efforts for
involving the other relations ultimately weaken the case of the prosecution
even against the real accused. No doubt, the charge has been framed against the
petitioners by the trial Court and revision petition filed against the charge
has also been dismissed but each case has to be examined on its own facts. In
the present case, it is evident that the petitioners have been roped in the
case merely because they are relatives of the husband of the complainant.
Hence, in the facts and circumstances of this case, it would be just and
expedient to quash the order vide which charge was ordered to be framed against
the petitioners and the order, vide which revision petition was dismissed by
the Additional Sessions Judge, Ludhiana. Accordingly, this petition is allowed.
The impugned orders dated 30.4.2007 (Annexures P-7 and P-8) passed by the
learned Judicial Magistrate, Ist Class, Ludhiana, order dated 4.6.2008
(Annexure P-9) passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track
Court), Ludhiana and all the subsequent proceedings, arising therefrom, qua
petitioners are quashed. (SABINA)

JUDGE

January 22, 2009

anita